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Abstract
If international atrocity crimes are acts so egregious that their impunity cannot be legally tolerated, why don’t we punish States that commit them? The rise of international criminal law is
celebrated as an achievement of the international rule of law, yet its advance effectively may come
at the expense of holding States accountable for their role in mass violence. Transitional justice
has emerged as the dominant normative framework for how the international community responds
to mass violence. Liberalism strongly influences transitional justice, which has produced individual criminal accountability as the desired form of legal accountability for atrocities. Transitional
justice rejects punishing States for atrocities as illiberal (collective punishment) and illegitimate
(lack of positive law). In fact, transitional justice theorization of justice largely ignores legal accountability for States. Without legal accountability, States enjoy moral and legal impunity for
their crimes. States escape their legal obligations to repair the injury they cause and to institute
reforms that secure a fuller measure of justice and peace. This Article examines how international
law and transitional justice have developed conceptually to effectively prevent legal accountability
for States that commit atrocity crimes, and argues that a new politics of transitional justice is necessary to harness the productive potential of State legal accountability to achieve a fuller measure
of international justice.
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ABSTRACT
If international atrocity crimes are acts so egregious that their
impunity cannot be legally tolerated, why don’t we punish States that
commit them? The rise of international criminal law is celebrated as
an achievement of the international rule of law, yet its advance
effectively may come at the expense of holding States accountable for
their role in mass violence. Transitional justice has emerged as the
dominant normative framework for how the international community
responds to mass violence. Liberalism strongly influences transitional
justice, which has produced individual criminal accountability as the
desired form of legal accountability for atrocities. Transitional justice
rejects punishing States for atrocities as illiberal (collective
punishment) and illegitimate (lack of positive law). In fact,
transitional justice theorization of justice largely ignores legal
accountability for States. Without legal accountability, States enjoy
moral and legal impunity for their crimes. States escape their legal
obligations to repair the injury they cause and to institute reforms that
secure a fuller measure of justice and peace. This Article examines
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how international law and transitional justice have developed
conceptually to effectively prevent legal accountability for States that
commit atrocity crimes, and argues that a new politics of transitional
justice is necessary to harness the productive potential of State legal
accountability to achieve a fuller measure of international justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Referring to the violence in Syria, Navi Pillay, then UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, declared: “It’s the Government that
is mostly responsible for the violations and all these perpetrators
should be identified and can if there is a referral to the International
Criminal Court.”1 This logic is as familiar as it is constructed. Ever
since the Nuremberg trials, the international community has embraced
individual criminal accountability as a value and goal necessary to
achieve justice for international atrocity crimes—acts that are now
recognized as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and

1. United Nations, UN/Syria Update, UNIFEED (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.
unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/U140/U140408d/ (last visited May 26, 2015); see also UN
Rights Chief: Syria Government Abuses ‘Far Outweigh’ Rebels, JURIST: PAPER CHASE (Apr.
9, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/04/un-rights-chief-syria-governmentabuses-far-outweigh-rebels.php.
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crimes of aggression.2 Justice punishes wrongdoers, removes bad
leaders, and aims to stop the bloodshed. Therefore, it is foreseeable
that as the civilian casualties and death toll mount in the Syrian crisis,
international consternation will move from hand wringing to
proposals for intervention. In May 2014, the UN Security Council
considered a French proposal to refer the situation in Syria to the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), who would
investigate and bring perpetrators to justice.3 Predictably, Russia and
China vetoed the resolution.4 Also unremarkable was that despite
acknowledgment that the Syrian State was committing international
crimes,5 the resolution contained no calls to punish the Syrian State
for these acts or to impose legal consequences for its involvement in
atrocities. Such measures might include compensation for the victims;
the establishment of a truth commission; or more muscular
interventions like ensuring free elections, redrafting the constitution,
or reform of state institutions. There is no supranational criminal
court of justice akin to the ICC, to which the Security Council could
refer the Syrian State for criminal sanction. In fact, few likely
considered the absence of international calls for State legal
accountability remarkable.
The permanent criminal court stands as the normative pinnacle
of the international community’s response to mass violence.
Prosecution by the ICC arguably confers the highest form of
international opprobrium and demonstrates the commitment of the
international community to provide justice for the crimes committed.
The Court stands as a symbol to punish leaders who have orchestrated
widespread and illegal destruction and functions as an institution to
normalize accountability for international crimes. Yet we are missing
2. International atrocity crimes refer to acts prohibited by states and criminalized by
international treaties or custom for which individuals may be prosecuted by international
criminal courts or by states that have jurisdiction over alleged wrongdoers. André
Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes, 8
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313, 332 (2010) [hereinafter Systemic Effects of International
Responsibility]. These crimes include the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity,
genocide, torture, and terrorism. Id. In this Article, the terms “international atrocity crimes”
and “mass atrocities” will be used interchangeably.
3. UN Security Council, The Situation on the Middle East, U.N. Doc.S/PV.7180, 3/18
(May 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 348, ¶ 2 U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter
Proposed Syria S.C. Resolution 348].
4. UN Security Council, The Situation on the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180, 4/18
(May 22, 2014).
5. Id. ¶ 1.
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an important discussion about legal accountability of the sovereign
State for its perpetration of mass violence. Ironically, as the
technologies of State violence become increasingly sophisticated and
brutally lethal (the use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians,
targeting of civilians and assaults of towns in Libya, aerial bombing
of villages in the Sudan, etc.), international institutions have narrowed
their targets of legal responsibility to a handful of individuals. In other
words, the legal response to atrocities has downsized its unit of
attention even though the legal and factual basis for State
accountability persists, if not grows stronger.
State-sponsored mass violence, such as that in Syria, is a result
of State policy, also referred to as “system criminality.”6 This means
that collective structures of the State become the instruments of
criminal terror and may be most obvious when Syrian armed forces
are deployed to attack civilians. Less visible when examining specific
violations, but critical to understanding the involvement of the State
in such horrors, are the ways in which the State infrastructure is used
as an instrument to contribute to and enable State policies of mass
violence. Just as Nazi extermination policies rested on discriminatory
laws, an authoritarian political structure, an economy geared toward
war, etc., so too is the Assad regime’s campaign against civilians an
escalation of the authoritarian State’s response to peaceful demands
for democratic reforms.7 State policies shape and maintain structural
inequalities that in turn produce and maintain political, social, and
economic marginalization, which contribute to conflict.8
The Allies’ defeat of Germany and Japan made possible the
imposition of extensive measures of accountability. The terms of
surrender for both States laid out a series of principles, which
included democratization, disarmament, justice for war criminals, as
well as economic reforms and reparations.9 Taken as a whole, these
6. Andre Nollkaemper, Introduction, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 1 (Andre Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt, eds. 2009) [hereinafter SYSTEM
CRIMINALITY].
7. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶ 27-40, U.N. Doc A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23,
2011); Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015).
8. Pablo de Greiff, Introduction, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT:
MAKING CONNECTIONS, 1 (Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds. 2009).
9. Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, 3
Bevans 1207 [hereinafter Potsdam Protocol], http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade
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initiatives may be understood as a comprehensive approach to
accountability for the unprecedented scale of destruction and mass
crimes perpetrated by the two vanquished States. Prosecution of
individuals for international crimes, while innovative, was only one
component of accountability. The Allies imposed democratization,
demilitarization, elimination of armaments industries and reparations
to prevent Germany and Japan from regenerating politically or
economically as threats to world peace. These measures aimed
fundamentally to disrupt and refashion the structural foundations of
State policies that produced the war to prevent another one. They also
signaled important normative commitments of the emerging
international system: unequivocal condemnation and repudiation of
the German and Japanese State ideologies that championed the war.
There are two aspects to the international accountability the
Allies imposed on Germany and Japan that have escaped the current
international justice discourse: (1) measures that conveyed normative
culpability of States that perpetrated atrocities and (2) the remedial
consequences of this judgment. The victors were not content merely
to have their enemies pay for their losses—the what of the war—but
they also sought to resolve the underlying factors that produced the
violence—the how and why of State criminality. Eradicating the
structural contributors to State criminality was linked to international
opprobrium of the Nazi regime, of which criminal accountability was
an extension, not a substitute. In the intervening years, although
accountability has become the rallying cry for the international justice
movement, this discourse does not encompass the full measures of
State legal accountability the Allies imposed, but has focused
exclusively on individual criminal accountability for such bloodshed.
There is a value to naming States culpable for their role in mass
violence which we have lost. Acts which the international community
recognizes as international crimes—genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes—are elevated as such because of their
gravity. By their nature, when perpetrated by State actors, these
crimes are committed in furtherance of State policy. A moral case can
be made for finding such States legally culpable for such acts. Doing
so inscribes moral condemnation and repudiation of offending State
polices. It also lays a legal foundation for appropriate remedies
17.asp. In the case of Germany, the Allies also required the dissolution of all Nazi institutions
and influences.
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against the State; remedies that address the what, how, and why of
State criminality. Without State culpability, we have effective State
impunity. While perhaps one day Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
might stand trial in The Hague, there is no mechanism to ensure that
the Syrian State will fulfill its legal duties to provide reparations to all
victims, institute democratic reforms, rebalance political power, and
other undertake other initiatives to address the structural foundations
of the State that enabled it to slaughter its residents. If part of the
rationale for individual accountability is that no one should be able to
commit egregious international harms without consequence, why do
we tolerate a different standard for States? It is curious that
international criminal law has assumed the moral apex of
international condemnation for mass atrocities to the exclusion of
punishing States for the same conduct. How has this come about and
what are the consequences of this approach?
The first and most obvious roadblock to punishing States for
their role in atrocities is that, despite efforts toward codification, State
crimes do not exist in international positive law.10 Nevertheless,
international law does establish legal consequences for State
perpetration of acts that constitute international crimes through the
law of state responsibility. The law of state responsibility involves a
legal determination of a breach of international obligations
attributable to a State and the legal consequences of such a breach.11
While States may not as a formal matter “commit crimes,” they may
be legally responsible for acts for which individuals also may be held
legally responsible as international crimes. The twin types of legal
responsibility—individual and State—for the same underlying act is a
concept referred to as “dual responsibility.”12 This lack of positive
law for State crimes is not a conceptual roadblock for State
accountability since international law already establishes principles of
10. Positive law is a “uniform order of social norms.” Frauke Lachenmann, Legal
Positivism, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R.
Wolfrum ed., 2011). As an “expression of basic social laws in the development of society,”
positive law prescribes the conduct of “legal persons.” Alexander Orakhelashvili, Natural Law
and Justice, THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R.
Wolfrum ed., 2007).
11. SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 23; Jutta Brunée, International Legal
Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L. L. 3,
21 (2005).
12. Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 337. While states
and individuals may each bear legal responsibility, pursuit of one form of responsibility does
not automatically trigger pursuit of the other.
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legal responsibility of States for their breaches. Nevertheless, State
sovereignty and the absence of a positive law of State crimes pose
challenges to creating processes of State accountability for system
criminality.
State responsibility for acts that are also international crimes is
an available tool through which international acknowledgment of
State wrongdoing can be achieved. The lack of codification of State
crimes is not an insurmountable barrier to establishing a process of
functional State culpability. As a formal matter, the nature of State
responsibility is not criminal and therefore the legal inscription of
culpability cannot attach to State responsibility for acts that are also
international crimes. Nevertheless, legal formalism will not mask the
normative judgment that State responsibility will convey. A finding of
State responsibility for acts that constitute genocide or crimes against
humanity effectively does the normative work that a formal finding of
criminal culpability achieves, which may explain, in part, why States
have not advanced its use.
The material consequences of State responsibility open the
possibility to develop a more robust reparations practice. State
responsibility triggers the duty of the State to repair the injury caused
by the breach. It is in this area that the Allies’ terms of surrender
should be understood as examples of the nature and extent of
measures culpable States should assume as a legal consequence of
State criminality: democratization, economic restructuring,
institutional reform, disarmament, etc.13 To prevent recurrence of the
violence, the structural contributors to state criminality should be
redressed under the rubric of State reparations.
The legal tools exist in international law to implement State
responsibility for international crimes. Yet State responsibility for
mass violence has not captured the discourse of international justice.
That pride of place belongs to individual criminal responsibility.
Birthed with the Nuremberg Principles in the aftermath of the Second
World War, “anti-impunity” and individual “accountability” for
atrocity crimes have been the rallying cries of the international justice
movement. States are called upon to fulfill their duties to execute or
facilitate individual criminal justice, but the international discourse of
accountability has not made State culpability for mass violence a
separate target of legal action. In fact, the discursive use of
13.

See Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9.
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accountability is somewhat at odds with the law of State
responsibility and injects a degree of confusion when considering
State criminality.14 Additionally, Gabriella Blum argues that since the
interventions by the Allies in Germany and Japan, the trend in
international law has been to move away from punishing States for
their bad acts and attributes this to an international preference for
prevention rather than punishment.15 This Article examines the lack
of interest in State culpability from a different perspective and argues
that the elision of State wrongdoing from the conceptualization of
legal accountability for international crimes helps to explain the
neglect of State criminality.
Thus, a second, and less obvious, roadblock to addressing State
culpability for international crimes is transitional justice. Transitional
justice is the field that dominates discussions of appropriate responses
to mass violence. Transitional justice as a field has absorbed the
normative, liberal,16 premise of the Nuremberg Principles, that
individual criminal accountability is necessary to condemn individual
14. Legal responsibility is a narrow concept, while legal accountability is broader and
refers to the process by which states are determined to be legally responsible for international
crimes and the consequences they should bear. As noted by Jutta Brunée, there is no fixed
meaning of “accountability” in international law, but it generally refers broadly to the
processes of determining whether an actor has met agreed standards of conduct and if there is a
breach of such standards, the consequences that the responsible party should bear. Brunée,
supra note 10, at 21-22, 24. For purposes of this discussion, the term “international legal
accountability” is adopted to refer a broader range of processes for determining the legal
wrongfulness of state behavior and appropriate consequences than the law of state
responsibility.
15. Gabriella Blum, The Crime and Punishment of States, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 57
(2013).
16. For purposes of this discussion, the concept of liberalism is located in legal
philosophy and political theory in that it refers to a basic legal and political commitment to
individual rights and freedoms and a system of government designed to curtail abuse of state
power on individual rights. Of particular relevance is that one of the core individual rights in a
liberal system include the individual right to be free from arbitrary arrest and punishment.
Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal
Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1013 (2005). A key principle of liberal legal systems is that
individuals may be punished only for individual acts and therefore collective or unindividuated attribution of responsibility is antithetical to respect for individual autonomy and
freedom. Liberal assignation of criminal guilt for mass atrocities is perhaps most famously
captured by German philosopher Karl Jaspers. Writing in the aftermath of the Second World
War, Jaspers reasoned that the German ‘people’ could not be legally guilty for the acts of
German leaders, but had moral or metaphysical guilt. KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF
GERMAN GUILT 32, 51-52, 73-74 (E.B. Ashton Trans., 1947). Thus in this discussion “liberal”
conceptions of criminality refer to attribution of legal responsibility to individuals for violating
legal norms.
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leaders and spares the people from collective guilt. Debates about
accountability endogenous to transitional justice focus on the priority
that should be given to criminal trials.17 However, these debates are
bound together with debates about the role of law and the extent to
which legalism18 and legal solutions should guide the field. Legal
accountability is understood to mean individual criminal
responsibility and State responsibility disappears from transitional
justice theorizations of legal justice.
A third factor that contributes to this blinkered approach to
international accountability for mass violence is the law itself. The
modern international legal system developed to disaggregate
consideration of individuals and States as culpable actors in
international law. The conventional understanding of how
international individual criminal responsibility became the central
feature of international justice draws a straight line from the
Nuremberg Principles and trials to the ICC. In other words, liberal
theories of retributive justice and deterrence captured the conceptions
of international justice. Yet taking into account the full range of
responses of the Allies to Germany and Japan and the broader
developments of international law that emerged from the war, we see
that other conceptions of accountability and legal responsibility for
mass atrocities were circulating and taking shape in positive law and
international institutions. The Allies not only established the
Nuremberg tribunal, but also exacted war reparations from Germany,
and instituted sweeping reforms of its State institutions. In the
immediate postwar period, nations invested heavily in developing a
new international legal system that built on normative aspects of this
response. Yet nations undertook efforts to codify and develop the
international legal framework as separate international branches of
law: international criminal law, international human rights law, and
17. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Editorial Note, 7 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 383, 388-90 (2013);
Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of Transitional
Democratic Governments, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 71-88 (1988).
18. Legalism is a key concept associated with liberal thought. As articulated by Judith
Shklar in her defining work on the topic, legalism is “the ethical attitude that hold moral
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationship to consist of duties and rights
determined by rules.” JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS
1 (1986). Shklar argued that legalism defines a system of thought, a political ideology, which
understands law as apart from the social world in which it operates. Id. at 2. Within the field of
transitional justice, scholars have questioned the prevalence of legalism as manifest by a
preference for legal (as opposed to non-legal) solutions to the legacies of mass violence. See
infra Part II.

2016]

TJ AND STATE ACCOUNTABILITY

457

the law of international State responsibility. These branches have
assumed varying levels of legal and institutional development. More
importantly for purposes of this discussion, these branches are not
integrated conceptually into a theory and discourse of international
justice. One result is that it is the Nuremberg legacy and not the
measures of State accountability that has become entrenched in
transitional justice; State measures of legal responsibility lie outside
the ambit of international justice.
Without a discourse that includes State culpability under the
banner of international justice and accountability, transitional justice
cedes important conceptual and practical ground in addressing
atrocity crimes. A justice discourse that included calls to address State
wrongdoing has legal purchase. While positive law does not admit of
State crimes, nonetheless legal recourse against States is possible
through the doctrine of State responsibility. Remedies for State
breaches could extend to the robust measures imposed on Germany
and Japan by the Allies after World War II, including reparations to
victims for the harms caused by State, loss of territory, international
administration, or other reforms of State institutions.
Structural reforms of State institutions are familiar as part of
peace negotiations. However, pursuing such measures as legal
obligations pursues important normative as well as material goals.
Linked with an international determination of breach of obligations
erga omnes, legal remedies would convey culpability and
blameworthiness, central values of individual criminal responsibility.
It is also possible that structural reforms may more muscular if legally
grounded as remedies for justice measures than if such efforts were
pursued as peacekeeping or policy options. However, to change its
conceptualization of accountability, transitional justice needs to
overcome its mistakenly liberal objections to State culpability and
promote a new politics of international accountability. International
law does not run afoul of liberal tenants by treating States as singular
entities of political governance and attributing legal responsibility to
them for breaches of international rules. Attribution of wrongfulness
to a State is a political, not legal, resistance. Change may begin with
new conceptual clarity that understands State culpability not as
collective punishment but as part of a process of holding the State
accountable for its involvement in international crimes as an artificial,
politically constructed entity distinct from “the people.” This
perspective would allow an international justice discourse and
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practice to emerge, recognizing that individual and State
responsibility co-exist comfortably and may be pursued, as
appropriate, as a holistic and legitimate responses to mass atrocities.
At the outset, it is important to clarify the parameters of this
project. This analysis concentrates on international legal processes of
accountability and determinations of legal responsibility for atrocity
crimes. While domestic legal systems are also capable of—and many
have been—implementing justice for international crimes and
addressing the role of the State in perpetrating atrocities, this Article
limits its examination to the international system. The content and
circulation within domestic contexts of concepts of international legal
accountability and responsibility are indeed critical to a
comprehensive understanding of the global implementation of justice.
However, the primary goal of this Article is narrower: to identify how
conceptions of international accountability have developed to exclude
State culpability and some of the effects of this theorization.
Similarly, while States are not the only entities that perpetrate
international crimes, this analysis does not consider non-State actors
or organizations as targets of legal responsibility for their
wrongdoing. The positive law regarding non-State actors continues to
evolve, but the differential treatment of non-State and State entities
under international law means that a separate analysis of
accountability for non-State actors is required. Finally, this piece does
not advance a definitive prescription for how international legal
responsibility should be implemented. A thorough treatment of that
question lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, by way of
example, this Article illustrates one existing mechanism to pursue
international State legal accountability: the UN Security Council.
The first Section of this Article reviews the relevant legal
developments of international norms and mechanisms from the end of
the Second World War to the present. This illustrates the conceptions
of accountability circulating in international law at the time, as well as
how these branches developed with distinct trajectories, legal
instruments, and enforcement mechanisms. The second Section turns
to an examination of how accountability is conceptualized in
transitional justice and reveals the ways in which transitional justice
submerges legal accountability of the State. The third Section
considers some of the effects of the status quo. The recent examples
of Security Council referrals to the ICC illustrate how the political
organ of international accountability, the best current option to
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enforce State responsibility, performs the transitional justice meme of
Nuremberg by insisting on individual criminal accountability while
ignoring State criminality. This Section identifies conceptual
challenges to transitional justice that illuminate the vise grip of
liberalism on the field and a new transitional justice politics is
imagined. The final Section concludes by calling for transitional
justice to marshal the full international law commitment to
accountability. Attending to distinct roles and responsibilities the
individual and State in the commission of atrocities furthers the
values of international rule of law and activates remedies
commensurate with the challenge to ensure a sustainable peace.
I. THE POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
BRANCHES REGULATING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MASS
CRIMES: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The response of the Allies to atrocities committed during the
Second World War spawned two new branches of law: international
human rights law and international criminal law. The Allies also
relied on longstanding interstate obligations to exact war reparations
from Germany.19 A brief review of these developments reminds us of
the exceptional legal growth during this period. It also reminds us that
the legal foundations for a robust, holistic approach to dual
responsibility exist.
We can consider the Potsdam Protocol,20 the instrument laying
out the principles that would control the Allies’ transition of Germany
and Japan from enemies to allies, as a conceptual blueprint for what
pursuit of dual accountability might look like. With this in mind, we
see that the postwar developments of international law differentially
advanced the document’s commitment to accountability for
individuals and States. If the Nuremberg prosecutions served as the
prototype for international criminal trials, the reparations provisions
along with the legal, economic, and political reform mandated by the
Potsdam Protocol offered a model for legal consequences to be
imposed upon States that violate jus cogens norms to commit mass
19. Ariel Colonomos & Andrea Armstrong, German Reparations to the Jews after
World War II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS 390-419 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
20. Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9.
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atrocities.21 International criminal law has assumed an advanced form
with establishment of a permanent criminal court. However,
normative development of the law of State responsibility stalled, and
State responsibility for human rights violations developed as a new
branch of international law with its own treaties and enforcement
mechanisms. The end result is that we have a fully articulated system
of international criminal law, while there is no parallel system to
enforce State responsibility for the same violations. The human rights
system offers a partial response but is not conceived of normatively or
structurally as a legal redress mechanism for system criminality. Such
a system requires the ability to tie legal responsibility to States with
commensurate remedial action.
The provisions of the Potsdam Protocol, while not conceived as
measures of reparation for state responsibility by its drafters,22 fit
within this legal category. These initiatives offer inspiration for the
type of systemic change that could be implemented as part of legal
accountability. To understand the conceptual distance that must be
traveled to come to this point, it is necessary to understand how the
seeds of the international justice movement developed wholly apart
from attention to system criminality and the problem of dual
responsibility for international crimes. This Section reviews the
development of international criminal law and enforcement
mechanisms from Nuremberg to the establishment of a permanent
International Criminal Court. It then examines the evolution of the
law of State responsibility and human rights over the same period. We
see how these latter two branches took shape such that they house the
legal potential for State accountability for atrocity crimes, but are
unable to fully realize the Potsdam model. All three legal branches of
international law developed centrifugally in relation to mass violence

21. See Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9, §§ (a)(II)(A)-(B).
22. The first mention of structural, legal, and/or policy reforms as a legal remedy for
state violations, known as a guarantee of non-recurrence or non-repetition, within the
international human rights system was in a 1993 report. Theo van Boven, (U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental), Study Concerning the Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, ¶¶ 47, 48, 55, section IX, principle
11; Pablo de Greiff, (Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and
guarantees of non-recurrence), Report to the Human Rights Council, ¶ 15, n.4, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/30/42, (Sept. 7, 2015) [hereinafter de Greiff Report].
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so that normatively and institutionally they work against a holistic
response to global horrors that call out for our full attention.
A. International Criminal Law
After a period of internal disagreement, at the Potsdam
Conference in July 1945, the Allies agreed to conduct criminal
prosecutions of major war criminals. Two years earlier, the Allies had
established a commission to collect evidence of war crimes.23
Initially, the British favored the arrest and immediate executions of a
small group of top identified war criminals.24 The contrary views of
US Secretary of War Henry Stimson eventually carried the day.25
Justice Robert H. Jackson, the prosecutor at Nuremberg, argued that
rule of law and adherence to liberal accountability were necessary to
deal with the Nazi leaders. He reasoned that retribution for large-scale
suffering required piercing State sovereignty to reach the individuals
responsible for ordering war crimes: “The idea that a state, any more
than a corporation, commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are
committed only by persons . . . . [I]t is quite intolerable to let such a
legalism become the basis of personal immunity.”26
A month later, the Allies concluded the Nuremberg Charter in
what commentators have heralded as a critical pivot point in
international law.27 These documents created an international tribunal
23. M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need
to Establish a Permanent Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 22-23 (1997)
[hereinafter From Versailles to Rwanda].
24. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 29 (1992); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 306-09 (4th ed. 2013).
25. Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 179
(1947). He argued that prosecutions rather than a night of the long knives would better reflect
on Allies as civilized nations in comparison to the barbarism of the Nazi regime. U.S.
Secretary of State Hull supported Stimson in this regard and argued that establishing the truth
of Nazi crimes before a world audience via a legal process would ensure the Germans could
not later evade the moral and political implications of the verdict as they had with Versailles
treaty. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 307-08. The German government later had claimed that
the admission of German guilt in the treaty had been exacted under duress. Id. at 354.
26. Justice Robert H. Jackson, Opening Speech at the Nuremberg Tribunal, THE
JACKSON CENTER (Nov. 21, 1945), http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speechesarticles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/opening-statement-before-the-internationalmilitary-tribunal/ [hereinafter Opening Speech]; see also Benjamin B. Ferencz, Tribute to
Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 365, 365-69 (2004).
27. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 66-67,
112-13 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
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to prosecute the Nazi architects of mass destruction of Jews and other
targets of persecution. The unprecedented scale and nature of Nazi
atrocities prompted the powerful States to create an exception to the
Westphalian notion of international law as a system of interstate
regulation. The sovereign immunity that had shielded individuals
from direct sanction yielded to the demands that those responsible be
punished. The Nuremberg judgment, reached a little over a year later,
solidified the principle that individuals have duties that “transcend the
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state” for
which they may be prosecuted notwithstanding orders of superiors.28
At the same time, the Allies prosecuted members of the Japanese
High Command in trials that lasted from May 1946 to November
1948,29 and national trials of war criminals that took place in Allied
countries in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War
signaled a new international commitment to justice.
The newly created UN General Assembly embraced this liberal
concept of international justice. In 1946, it unanimously adopted a
resolution affirming the principles of the Nuremberg judgment as
international law principles thereby essentially ratifying the existence
of international criminal law30 and moved toward codifying
international crimes and creating a mechanism to enforce them. As
part of the UN’s broader efforts to develop an international legal
system, the UN General Assembly created the International Law
Commission (“ILC” or “Commission”), a body of experts charged
with promoting the development and codification of international
law.31 At the request of the General Assembly in 1947, the ILC
undertook to formulate the Nuremberg Principles and prepare a draft
code of international offenses.32 The ILC prepared a first text of the
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
28. Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgment and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 221 (1947).
29. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 365; see From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 24,
at 31-37.
30. G.A. Res. 95 (I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by
the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1/95 (Dec. 11, 1946); G.A. Res. 177
(II) (Nov. 21, 1947)..
31. G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947).
32. G.A. Res. 177 (II), supra note 30. The UN General Assembly called on the ILC
predecessor organization, the Committee on the Codification of International Law, to
formulate the Nuremberg Principles and prepare a draft code. The Committee began this work,
which the ILC inherited and completed. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 27, at 579.
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(“Draft Code”) in 1951, followed by a revised version in 1954.33
Concurrently, formulation of a draft statute for establishing a
permanent criminal court was delegated to another special rapporteur,
who argued that the task of developing a substantive criminal code
and a statute for an international criminal code should complement
one another.34 Yet these two projects remained purposefully
separated.35 The General Assembly constituted a Special Committee
to prepare a draft statute for a permanent criminal court (“Draft
Statute”).36 However, the completion of both the Draft Code and
Draft Statute was ultimately tabled until the UN had arrived at an
agreed definition of the crime of aggression.37
The Cold War largely froze further development and
enforcement of international criminal law.38 Certainly there continued
to be atrocities committed in international armed conflicts—the
33. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 9 at 133-37, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
123, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/48; see also LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
8-10 (1997). The title of the Draft Code was changed to the “Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind” in 1988. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 27, at 579. Note the ILC only drafted principles but did not discuss the
evolution of international criminal law principles from positive law. See Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Justice: Postwar Legacies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615, 1619 n.2 (2006) (“The
dilemma raised at Nuremberg relating to the rule of law catalyzed a debate on the nature of
international norms and the extent to which these could be considered consistent with positive
law. Ultimately, Nuremberg would imply a move away from support of positivist principles of
interpretation and towards an endorsement of natural law principles.”); see also Quincy
Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 405, 406-14
(1948).
34. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 580.
35. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Court Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc.
A/2135 (1952). Bassiouni attributes the separate tracks of developing a code and a court to the
reluctance of powerful states to establish an international criminal justice system: “the lack of
synchronization was not entirely fortuitous: it was the result of a political will to delay the
establishment of an international criminal court, because that was a time when the world was
sharply divided and frequently at risk of war.” INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 27, at 583.
36. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 581.
37. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 8 (2d rev. & updated ed., 1987);
SUNGA, supra note 33, at 15, 40-45.
38. After the World War II criminal tribunals, there were no internationally-sponsored
criminal trials until the UN established the ad hoc criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
However, there were a handful of national criminal trials against perpetrators of crimes
committed during the Second World War, notably the Israeli prosecution of Adolf Eichmann.
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (2006);
see also From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 23, at 38-39.
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unsuccessful war of secession in Biafra, the ultimately successful but
bloody war of independence in Bangladesh, and the My Lai massacre
by American forces in South Vietnam. Yet the geopolitical impasse of
the Communist bloc and the West assured that no international
consensus could be reached that would rise above ideology to punish
those responsible for mass atrocities.39
The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a new era in international
criminal justice. Many heralded the post-Cold War realignment as
bringing democracy’s freedom and prosperity to former Communist
states.40 The breakup of Yugoslavia loosened the restraints of Tito’s
communist State, which the leader had secured through an ideology
of “Brotherhood and Unity.”41 The rise of nationalism across the
ethnically mixed Balkan republics sparked the violent breakup of the
Yugoslav federation. From 1991-1995, fighting in Croatia and Bosnia
took the form of violent ethnic cleansing of civilian populations, the
epitome of which was Bosnian Serb forces overrunning the UNprotected hamlet of Srebrenica and slaughtering 8,000 Bosniak men
and boys;42 literally committing genocide under the nose of United
Nations peacekeeping forces.
Aided by the 24-hour news cycle, the Balkan conflict unfolded
in the full gaze of the international community. Diplomats and world
leaders took notice and action. In the midst of the fighting, in May
1993, the UN Security Council acted under its Chapter VII powers to
establish an international criminal tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.43 International
criminal justice continued to gain momentum. In November 1994, the
Security Council created another criminal tribunal, this time to
prosecute perpetrators of genocide and other international crimes
committed in Rwanda.44 Unleashed after the plane carrying Hutu
President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down on April 6th, organized
39. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 565-66.
40. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(1992).
41. Tone Bringa, The Peaceful Death of Tito and the Violent End of Yugoslavia, in
DEATH OF THE FATHER: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE END IN POLITICAL AUTHORITY 148-200
(John Borneman ed., 2004).
42. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J 43,
83-84, 155-56 (Feb. 26)).
43. S.C. Res. 827, (May 25, 1993).
44. S.C. Res. 955, (Nov. 8, 1994).
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ethnic militias called the Interahamwe rampaged throughout the
Rwandan capital and countryside, targeting ethnic Tutsis for
gruesome killing.45 In the end, Interahamwe forces killed
approximately 800,000 Tutsis over 100 days; the bloodshed halted by
the Tutsi rebel invasion in July 1994.46 With UN involvement, the
conflicts in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone were followed by
the establishment of specialized criminal tribunals to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes.47
This trend toward international criminal accountability as a
component of post-conflict peace reached a new level in 2002, when
the world’s first permanent international criminal court began
operating. Its creation owes a debt to the postwar efforts at the UN to
codify international criminal law. The General Assembly considered
creating a draft code of international crimes again in 1981.48
45. Genocide
in
Rwanda,
UNITED
HUMAN
RIGHTS
COUNCIL,
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2016).
46. Id.
47. In 2000, the UN Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (“UNTAET”) passed a
law that established a Serious Crimes Panel within the new country’s national court system.
On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses,
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000); see also INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE
SERIOUS CRIMES PROCESS IN TIMOR-LESTE: IN RETROSPECT 1, 12-14 (2006). That same year,
the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (“UNMIK”) passed Regulation 64, which created
international panels to prosecute international crimes within the Kosovar court system. On
Assignment of International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue,
UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (Dec. 15, 2000). In 2003, three different courts prosecuting
international crimes were established. First, a special agreement between Sierra Leone and the
United Nations established the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Secretary-General, Report
of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). Second, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
was founded by an agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia to prosecute
perpetrators of crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime of 1975-1979. G.A. Res.
57/228 (May 22, 2003). Third, the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber was established by the
Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a division of mixed international
and national judges and prosecutors within the national Bosnian legal system. See Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Briefed on Establishment of War Crimes
Chamber within State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Press Release SC/7888 (Oct. 8,
2003). Most recently, in 2007, a UN Security Council Resolution established the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. S.C. Res. 1757 (May 30, 2007).
48. In 1981, the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the ILC to resume its
prior work on the Draft Code. SUNGA, supra note 33, at 9; see also G.A. Res. 36/106 (Dec. 10,
1981). By this time, a definition for the “crime of aggression” had been adopted (in 1974),
removing the reason for tabling progress on the Draft Code. SUNGA, supra note 33, at 79-80.
Additionally, efforts by a number of governments and NGOs had forced the issue back onto
the General Assembly’s agenda. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 27, at 582.
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However, revival of international criminal accountability really
gained momentum in 1991 when, against the backdrop of fighting in
Croatia, the ILC generated an official version of a new Draft Code.49
A year later, the General Assembly requested the ILC to prepare a
draft statute for a permanent criminal court.50 Thus the drafting of a
code of international crimes and a mechanism for their enforcement
proceeded on separate tracks.51
Preparations for a permanent court got underway in earnest in
1994, when the General Assembly constituted an ad hoc committee to
develop a process to establish a court based on the ILC’s Draft
Statute.52 Over the next four years, State representatives negotiated a
treaty to establish a permanent court,53 the final text of which, the

49. In 1991, the ILC adopted a comprehensive catalog of crimes, the scope of which far
surpassed that of the 1954 draft code. SUNGA, supra note 33, at 11. The Draft Code comprises
the classic Nuremberg and Tokyo Charter violations (crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity), as well as the crimes of genocide and intervention. Draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1991] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 186, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.459/Add. 1 (Jul. 5, 1991).
50. In 1989, efforts at codification accelerated after the General Assembly considered a
proposal by Trinidad and Tobago to establish an international court to prosecute drug
traffickers and other international crimes. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 27, at 585; see also SUNGA, supra note 33, at 15.
51. This had the somewhat anomalous effect that the work on the draft statute came to
fruition with the creation of the Rome Statute in 1998, while work on the Draft Code
continued on a different track, and the final draft that the ILC produced in 1996 contained
definitions of crimes that differ from those in the Rome Statute. See John Allain & John R.
W.D. Jones, A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, 8 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 100 (1997). The Special Rapporteur
leading the drafting put forward a severely truncated version, eliminating the following
categories of violations from the Code’s coverage: threat of aggression; intervention; colonial
domination and other forms of alien domination; apartheid; mercenary activity; terrorism; drug
trafficking; and willful and severe damage to the environment. This left only the crime of
aggression, genocide and war crimes, and added crimes against the United Nations and
associated personnel and crimes against humanity, and incorporated specific reference to rape
in provisions prohibiting crimes against humanity and war crimes. See Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Titles and Texts of Draft Articles, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.522 of 31 (May 1996); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Rep. on the Work of its
Fourty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.527/Add. 10 (July 16, 1996); SUNGA, supra note
33, at 13-14.
52. U.N. General Assembly, Sixth Comm., Establishment of an International Criminal
Court: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/49/L.24 (Nov. 23, 1994).
53. Following the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly set up the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“PrepCom”),
which would meet twice in 1996 and prepare “consolidated texts” for a draft international
criminal court statute. U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 87th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 ¶ 2
(Dec. 11, 1995); INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 589.
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Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), was adopted in
Rome in 1998 on a vote of 120-7 (with 21 abstentions).54 Four years
later, with the requisite 60 State ratifications, the treaty entered into
force. UN officials, State leaders, representatives of NGOs, and
international commentators hailed the ICC as fulfilling the unstated
promise symbolized by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals almost 50
years prior:55 as part of its commitment to value human dignity, the
rule of law, and peace, the international community would confront
mass atrocities through individual criminal responsibility. Equipped
with a standing international court with jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes, “never again” would not be a trope but a serious
commitment to guide international efforts to end impunity for those
who waged large-scale, illegal, and brutal campaigns.
The power of the idea of international criminal justice is
manifest in its fruition. With the ICC, international criminal
responsibility is now a permanent feature of the international legal
order. The legal form this takes is the criminal trial. Like domestic
criminal law, it is quintessentially a liberal exercise in retributive
justice. However, as conceived in international law by the Allies who
initiated criminal trials, international criminal responsibility is further
justified by liberalism’s aversion to collective punishment. German
philosopher Karl Jaspers theorized this idea as a categorical rejection
of the possibility that the German “people” could be legally guilty for
the acts of German leaders.56 The more recent propulsion of
international criminal sanctions in response to mass violence has been

PrepCom published its final report leading up to the plenipotentiary conference in Italy in
1998. Id. at 591-94.
54. About the Court, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited
Feb. 1, 2016).
55. Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg, 10
PACE INT’L L. REV. 203 (1998); The International Criminal Court: 2007-2008 Fact Sheet
One, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/IJA_Factsheet_
1_International_Criminal_Court.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (“For more than half a century
since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, states have largely failed to bring to justice those
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. With the creation of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), the world has begun to fulfill the post-World War II
promise of ‘never again.’”).
56. KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 32, 51-52, 73-74 (E.B. Ashton
Trans., 1947).
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aided by scholars who similarly argue that prosecutions of individual
leaders are a vital tool to avoid collective guilt.57
Individual criminal responsibility has become the form of legal
accountability for atrocities meted out by the international system.
Thus the idea of State legal accountability for atrocities is implicitly
excluded from the project of international justice. Yet at the same
time that the Nuremberg Principles are being formulated, States are
undertaking projects that understand States are actors capable of
committing acts of grave harm and which seek to establish
international regulations that will hold them accountable for such
transgressions. These projects were not integrated into the
conceptualization or institutionalization of international criminal law
but demonstrate the doctrinal and institutional firewall of dual
responsibility.
B. State Responsibility and Human Rights
While international criminal responsibility gains legitimacy from
its liberal foundations, longstanding international principles of State
responsibility establish State legal accountability for their breaches of
international obligations without being discredited as illiberal. Partly,
this is due to conceptions of sovereignty under international law
which treat states as singular actors and not “the people;”58 also, the
rejection of State crimes in positive law means that States may violate
legal obligations but such violations are not formally criminal. Thus it
is possible to speak of State legal violations and breaches but not of
State legal guilt and culpability.
Yet, there is an element of legal fiction to this distinction.
Postwar developments to codify international law, in particular in the
areas of State responsibility and human rights, indicate that
preventing State atrocities and holding States legally responsible for
such abuses were central to efforts establishing this new world order.
Furthermore, the reparations measures imposed against the defeated
57. For a discussion of the argument that international trials avoid collective guilt see
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002); see also Antonio
Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998); GARY
JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 20-26 (2000).
58. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
141-42 (8th ed. 2012).
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Germany certainly conveyed moral condemnation and the normative
optics of the interventions blurred the traditional line between civil
and penal sanctions. As remedies for State breaches, these measures
included monetary payments and restitution.59 The political goals of
the Allied occupation of postwar Germany were to refashion the
defeated enemy into a pacific, democratic State.60 The principles of
the Potsdam Protocol should be understood as defining the type of
initiatives that can be pursued as legal measures of accountability for
State criminality insofar as these are directed to prevent State
repetition of the abuses. Thus the Allied response to Nazi criminality
included not just international criminal liability but also aimed to
realign the State institutions and reform the structures of the Nazi
State that enabled its violence.
The political and economic reforms of the German State outlined
in the Potsdam Protocol did not become a blueprint for international
law and practice as did the war crimes prosecutions of Nazi leaders.
The postwar codification efforts of State responsibility and human
rights developed separately from each other as well as international
criminal law and did not result in a set of legal regulations or a
mechanism that could address individual and State wrongdoing
together. The next section outlines the rise and fall of State crimes in
the effort to develop international law for a new age. It then turns to
the development of the international human rights regime where State
responsibility takes a particular legal form, which at best offers a
partial substitute for the Potsdam Protocol model. As a result, the
international legal system permits legal guilt to attach only to
individuals and not to States, and largely leaves enforcement of the
international law of State responsibility for mass atrocities to the
human rights regime. The conceptual untethering of State guilt and
legal responsibility from international justice has drained transitional
justice of important tools to address mass violence in a holistic
manner. Nevertheless, the legal concepts necessary to do so exist.

59. Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations, 23 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 314, 322-24 (2005).
60. Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9, § (a)(II)(A)(3)(iv) (“The purposes of the
occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are . . . [t]o prepare for
the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual
peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.”).
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1. Codification Efforts of State Responsibility
The Holocaust and other mass horrors require State policies and
structures to perpetrate. How did the new international order wish to
address accountability of States for such acts going forward? The
establishment of the United Nations brought States into a formal
collective, but one which, by design, accepted State sovereign
equality as a founding principle. It thus relied on State agreement to
accept regulation of its conduct except in narrow circumstances.61
Given the backdrop of World War II, it is not surprising that
strengthening the international law of State responsibility was one of
the earliest topics taken up by the ILC, for this would clarify how
State breaches of international obligations are determined as well as
the legal consequences for such conduct. Nor should it be surprising
that this effort addressed responsibility for State “crimes.” However,
the fact that the Commission took over 45 years to complete its work
and that the final document makes no explicit mention of State crimes
indicates the difficulty of achieving State consensus on this issue.
Over time, consensus on this point dissipated, and in the end, the final
document only indirectly acknowledges State crimes.
a. Efforts to Define State Responsibility for International Crimes
The ILC began its work in 1955 to prepare a draft of
international law principles that would govern State responsibility,
and Francisco García-Amador was appointed as the Special
Rapporteur leading the effort.62 A total of six Special Rapporteurs
shepherded the process, generating multiple reports (styled as reports,
these documents served as proposed drafts of principles which the
ILC would consider for further action), and which concluded in 2001
when the ILC adopted the draft articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles” or “Draft Articles
on State Responsibility”).63 The drafting process saw substantial
61. The power to authorize military force, the ultimate exercise of coercive state action,
is reserved to the UN Security Council in circumstances necessary to maintain or restore peace
and security. U.N. Charter art. 39.
62.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/94, at 42 (1955).
63. The ILC, composed of international legal experts drawn from various segments of
the international legal community, forwarded its proposals for codification to a subgroup of
state representatives (the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly), which then deliberates
and may reject or forward drafts to the General Assembly. In this way, ILC’s work to develop
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changes to key concepts over time, including State crimes, reflecting
the evolution of available legal common ground. The Commission’s
first Special Rapporteur, García-Amador, included State crimes in his
reports on the subject,64 and this principle remained a live issue
through decades of drafting, though subject to frequent debate. The
arguments advanced by proponents and opponents of State crimes
reflect divisions in thought over fundamental questions about the
nature of international law as well as its utility in regulating State
behavior.
Throughout the drafting history, there appeared to be broad
consensus that not all State breaches were of the same character; in
other words, there was a difference between a merely “wrongful”
State action and State offenses that were particularly egregious or
“criminal.”65 Partly, this reflected a postwar acceptance of the need
for international law to respond to State-sponsored violence like that
unleashed by the Nazi regime. This view was also consistent with the
traditional international law principle that States are responsible for
reparations for any wrongful breach. This principle reflects a tort, or
civil, liability model of State accountability, which includes the
possibility of punitive sanctions for “wrongful” State acts as a form of
reparation.66 Through subsequent years of reports and discussion, the
concept of State crimes took hold and was reflected in acceptance of a
bifurcation of state breaches—those that were delicts, or merely
wrongful, and those that were crimes. This framework was reflected
in the first draft of the instrument formally adopted by the

and codify international law is ultimately controlled by states in this exercise of positive law
generation.
64. See, e.g., F.V. García-Amador (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), First
Rep. on Int’l Responsibility, ¶¶ 46-53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (Jan. 20, 1956).
65. James Crawford, The System of International Responsibility, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 17, 22 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
66. See, e.g., F.V. García-Amador (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Sixth
Rep. on Int’l Responsibility, ¶¶ 56, 145. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134 and Add.1 (Jan. 26, 1961)
(“[B]oth in diplomatic practice and in the case-law of the claims commissions, the reparation
of an injury caused to an alien individual is fairly often frankly ‘punitive’ in character. Its
purpose—namely, to punish or at least reprove a State for its conduct—either explicitly or
implicitly, and thereby to try to prevent a repetition of such acts in the future, is in fact the
most characteristic and distinctive feature of this mode of reparation.”). In this view, accepting
sanctions for egregious behavior did not necessarily introduce the municipal notion of
“criminal” sanctions into international law because the purpose of sanctions was reparative
rather than punitive and thus did not distort traditional conceptions of regulation of interstate
relations.
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Commission in 1980.67 Article 19 recognized a distinction between
“delicts” and “international crimes” (exceptionally grave breaches of
international law).68
Although there was agreement regarding a hierarchy of
breaches, there was disagreement about how to identify which
breaches constituted crimes—in particular whether all peremptory
norms qualified as crimes69—as well as what should be the
consequences for such breaches.70 States had categorical objections to
67. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Thirty-Second Session, ¶¶ 34-48,
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980).
68. See id. ¶ 34, art. 19 (“International crimes and international delicts—(1) An act of a
State which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful
act, regardless of the subject-matter of the obligation breached. (2) An internationally wrongful
act which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the
protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized
as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime.”).
69. See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, ¶¶ 75-122,
U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976) (including Draft Article 19 and accompanying commentary);
Marina Spinedi, International Crimes of State: The Legislative History, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLE 19, 21-22 (Joseph
Weiler, Antonio Cassese & Marina Spinedi eds., 1989). In coming to his conclusion, Ago
analyzed relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, resolutions of the General
Assembly, and international case law, including in particular the ruling of the ICJ in the
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd. case. See Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
70. See, e.g., Roberto Ago (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep.
on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 (Apr. 20, 1970); Gaetano
Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fourth Rep. on State
Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/444 and Add.1-3 (1992); Gaetano
Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Third Rep. on State Responsibility,
Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/440 (July 19, 1991); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Special
Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1 (1989); Willem Riphagen (Special
Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fifth Rep. on the Content, Forms and Degrees of Int’l
Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/380 and Corr.1 (Apr. 4, 1984); Willem
Riphagen (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fourth Rep. on the Content, Forms
and Degrees of Int’l Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366 and Add.1 &
Add.1/Corr.1 (1983); Willem Riphagen (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Third
Rep. on the Content, Forms and Degrees of Int’l Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/354 and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2 (1982); Willem Riphagen, (Special Rapporteur on
State Responsibility), Second Rep. on the Content, Forms and Degrees of Int’l Responsibility,
Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/344 and Corr.1 & Corr.2 (May 1, 1981); Roberto Ago
(Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 and Add.1 (1972); Roberto Ago (Special Rapporteur on
State Responsibility), Third Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/246 and Add.1-3 (1971); Robert Ago (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility),
Second Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 (Apr. 20,
1970).
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State crimes and the concept of penal sanctions;71 many
representatives of States opposed codification based on fears that
powerful States would use State crimes to coerce less powerful,72 and
others raised procedural objections regarding how and who would
define State crimes and what and whether procedural safeguards
could be sufficient to ensure States would not be unfairly punished.73
Undergirding these debates was a debate about the nature of
international law itself and whether “wrongs” in international law
could be conceptualized properly according to municipal law,
whether as torts or crimes, or whether wrongs in international law
were of another character entirely.74
b. Differentiation of International Legal Responsibility
Ultimately, the objections to State crimes carried the day. States
relegated criminal accountability for mass violence the exclusive
domain of international criminal law. The final bargain that the Draft
Articles struck was recognition of State responsibility for jus cogens
violations and erga omnes obligations but dropped explicit reference
to State crimes, their definition, consequences for their commission,
and a mechanism to enforce them. Interestingly, this took place
contemporaneous to the drafting of the statute for the ICC—an
undertaking that required States to address these same issues with
71. JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 393 (Cambridge
Univ. Press ed. 2013); Georges Abi-Saab, The Uses of Article 19, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 339,
341-42 (1999); Gilbert Guillame, Overview of Part One of the Articles on State Responsibility,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 187, 190. In addition,
state practice did not support recognition of state crimes since at that time, no state had ever
been accused of criminal conduct before an international court. Abi-Saab, supra, at 345.
72. Int’l Law Comm’n, Comments and Observations Received from Governments,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488 and Add.1-3, 112-23 (1998). For instance, “absence of institutional
control over interpretive disagreements would play [into] the hands of the powerful States.”
Martti Koskenniemi, Doctrines of State Responsibility, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 45, 49.
73. See James Crawford (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), First Rep. on
State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶¶ 84-86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/490 and Add.1-7 (1998)
[hereinafter First Rep. on State Responsibility].
74. See Draft Convention on “Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners” Prepared by Harvard Law School (1929),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n at 229-30, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l; Alain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibility in International
Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 71, at 3, 3-16; Antoine
Ollivier, International Criminal Responsibility of the State, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 703, 714.
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regard to individual accountability. James Crawford, the sixth Special
Rapporteur and the one who eliminated the controversial Article 19
from the draft, spearheaded the final effort to submit Draft Articles at
the same time as the treaty negotiations for the International Criminal
Court entered full swing.75
Opposition to Draft Article 19 stemmed in part from arguments
that individual criminal accountability was the appropriate providence
for sanctioning the commission of atrocities, and that recognition of
State crimes would undermine prosecutions of individuals for such
acts.76 States also emphasized that the international system designated
the Security Council as the appropriate body to consider how best to
address acts that would be considered state crimes as threats to peace
and security.77 And in any case, the Draft Articles would not affect
the Security Council’s exercise of its powers.78
While a far cry from the explicit recognition of State crimes in
the earlier draft, commentators point out that the final document is
more flexible than it might seem and arguably creates “public
interest” standing that allows any State to call for State accountability
for breaches of peremptory norms,79 and collective enforcement by
States could include not only cessation and other forms of reparations
but also countermeasures.80 Scholars have argued that the Draft

75. The PrepCom issued its final report in October 1996. INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 594. Crawford dropped the language of
state crimes from the draft in 1996, the same year states finalize the Rome Statute. See Vera
Gowlland-Debbas, Responsibility and the United Nations Charter, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 71, at 115, 120. Interestingly, in negotiations of
the Rome Statute, states opposed a draft provision on reparations that arguably would allow
the court to make reparations awards against states on the ground that the court was limited to
individual accountability. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 263-64 (Roy S. K. Lee ed., 1999).
76. See First Rep. on State Responsibility, supra note 73, ¶¶ 53(a) and (c), 88 (“The
need for that notion may also be reduced by the development of institutions for prosecuting
and trying individuals for international crimes, as exemplified by the proposed international
criminal court.”).
77. See id. ¶ 52 (c) and (e).
78. Id. ¶ 87.
79. James Crawford, Overview of Part Three of the Articles on State Responsibility, in
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 931, 934.
80. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
art. 41 ¶ 3, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 41 ¶ 3, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility], (“This article is without prejudice to the
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Articles offer an important framework, upon which States can build.
In 2001, the UN recognized the final proposed text but has not taken
further action to turn the draft principles into a treaty.81 And the ICJ
has ratified the ILC position that State criminality is not part of
customary or principles of international law.82 In other words, the
Draft Articles set a floor for agreement about State responsibility for
peremptory norms (without limiting these further to those that might
be “state crimes”) and do not prevent States from generating a more
robust set of norms through treaty law that would delineate what
constitutes State criminal behavior and creating an enforcement
mechanism.
The history of the Draft Articles illustrates how States jealously
policed the boundaries of international criminal accountability. They
curtailed acknowledgement that States may commit acts categorized
as international crimes with the formal legal opprobrium that comes
with criminal responsibility. If during the early postwar period it was
conceivable that there would be an international accountability
framework to implement legal responsibility of individuals and States
that commit international crimes, the defeat of Article 19 and the
completion of the Rome Statute meant the end of such ambition for a
holistic approach. While breathing life into the Nuremberg Principles
nearly 50 years after the fact with the creation of the ICC, States put
the kybosh on State crimes even while recognizing that states may be
implicated in international crimes. The normative condemnation that
accompanies State culpability for system criminality is not available
as a formal matter. Yet the international law remedies for State
breaches offer a functional equivalent when accompanied by a finding
of international legal responsibility for atrocity crimes.83
other consequences referred to in this part and to such further consequences that a breach to
which this chapter applies may entail under international law.”).
81. See G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 3, (Dec. 12, 2001) (taking note of the Articles and
commending them to the attention of Governments, without prejudice to their future adoption
as a treaty text or other appropriate action).
82. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 167-70 (Feb. 27, 2007); James Crawford,
International Crimes of State, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
65, 403, 413-14. However, the court did find that states could be legally responsible for
genocide under the Genocide Convention. See Saira Mohamed, A Neglected Option: The
Contributions of State Responsibility for Genocide to Transitional Justice, 80 COL. L. REV.
327 (2009).
83. Treaty law currently establishes some provision of state remedies for acts that are
also international crimes, although these mechanisms are rarely used. The Genocide
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Like the law of State responsibility, international human rights
law establishes legal consequences for State violations of
international obligations. Because of the overlap between acts that
constitute international crimes and human rights violations, the
conceptualization of State responsibility in human rights law bears on
this inquiry.
2. Human Rights Law
If part of the impetus of the Allies for prosecuting members of
the Nazi high command was to settle the score with Germany’s
leaders for their responsibility for the horrors they unleashed, the
Allies also worked to create a postwar order that could prevent the
recurrence of similar destruction. These goals proceeded along
parallel tracks. While the Nuremberg trials set in motion the
development of international criminal law, the creation of the United
Nations sparked the emergence of an international human rights
regime. This began at the end of the war when high-level officials
from the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China
met at Dumbarton Oaks and pledged to create a new international
institution that would serve to facilitate peaceful interstate relations—
a bulwark against another disastrous world war.84 Less than a year
later, on June 26, 1945, representatives signed the United Nations
Charter. The document includes in its preamble a commitment to
human rights as one of the purposes of this new world institution.85

Convention and the Geneva Conventions establish that offending states are liable for
reparations in the event of breaches. Supra note 68. The provisions for reparations under the
Geneva Conventions are also part of customary law. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Rule 149,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule149 (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); id.,
Rule 150. Here as well, the lack of an enforcement mechanism hampers the utility of this
norm. CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR VICTIMS
OF ARMED CONFLICT, 33 (2012).
84. History of the UN Charter, 1944-1945: Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1944-1945dumbarton-oaks-and-yalta/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
85. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 35; JACOB ROBINSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS—A COMMENTARY
(1946); see U.N. Charter prmbl. (“We the peoples of the United Nations have determined . . .
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.”); U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3 (“The purposes of the
United Nations are . . . [to] promot[e] and encourage[e] respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all”).
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What were human rights and what conception of State
responsibility do they embody? The Charter set out the structure to
elaborate their content, but their animating idea was to universalize
rights-based protection of the individual from abuse by the State. The
Charter established the Economic and Social Council with power to
set up a Human Rights Commission. Chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt,
the Commission set out to give content to the Charter’s lofty language
of human rights. The Commission worked from April 1946 to
December 1948 to draft an international instrument that established
the “fundamental human rights” the Charter invoked.86 The result was
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which
together with subsequent two human rights treaties is referred to as
the International Bill of Rights. As the delegates hashed out what
fundamental guarantees states should honor, the record of the horrors
of the Nazi regime played in the background. According to Geoffrey
Robertson:
The most profound influence on the Commission was the
evidence from the trial of the Nazi leaders, which lasted from
Justice Jackson’s opening on 20 November 1945 to the judgment
on 30 September 1946 . . . . The evidence upon which the
judgment was based would provide the rationale for many of the
clauses of the Universal Declaration.87

Delegates received reports from the trials, which disclosed Nazi
tactics of mass persecution. These served as cautionary tales for just
how terrifying the power of State violence can be when the State
apparatus is organized to target groups. Details about Einsatzgruppen
massacres (German units deployed specifically to target and kill Jews,
Gypsies, other civilians, and Soviet political commissars), the
implementation of the Final Solution via a network of concentration
camps, Dr. Mengele’s cruel “medical” experiments on Jewish
prisoners, and other tactics of the Third Reich helped solidify the
determination of delegates to establish universal principles to protect
individual dignity.88 In particular, after receiving one such report,
delegates drafted Article 2 of the UDHR which inscribes the State
duty of non- discrimination based on “race, colour, sex, language,
religion, policy or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
86. Drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Historical Record of the
Drafting Process, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://research.un.org/en/undhr.
87. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 40.
88. Id. at 41-42.
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birth or other status.”89 The record of the brutal depredations inflicted
by the Nazis mounted and underscored the moral imperative to
establish a framework for state recognition and guarantee of
individual rights.
The UDHR served as a statement of the fundamental individual
rights that States in the modern era recognized and pledged to
achieve. It also marked the beginning of a period of standard setting
and formalization of these principles as legal obligations of States at
the international level as well as through new regional organizations
formed to facilitate and promote interstate cooperation. In a decadeslong process protracted by rising Cold War politics, in 1966 the
Commission finalized two treaties, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant
on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (“IECSR”). These
instruments elaborated the rights in the UDHR in a legally binding
framework that for signatory States established a mechanism for
independent experts to monitor State compliance. Since that time, the
United Nations has generated additional human rights treaties focused
on specific abuses, like torture90 and race discrimination91 or on
particular groups like women,92 children,93 migrants,94 and the
disabled.95 The international treaty system is complemented at the
regional level by additional human rights treaty-based mechanisms,
some of which, like the European and Inter-American, have stronger

89. Id; see JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT (1999); Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the
Universal Declaration, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 357 (1993). Other rights were also drafted with the
vivid memory of how the Nazi regime subverted individual rights through a system of control
over public and private life including core principles like judicial independence, rule by
popular consent, and the rights of families to have choice in their child’s education.
ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 42.
90. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
91. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 12, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
92. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S 13.
93. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
94. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
95. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Dec.
13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
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enforcement procedures than those provided through the UN treaties
and have generated significant and binding judgments.96
The conception of international accountability of States that
violate human rights guarantees reflected in the UN treaty regime is
consistent with the law of State responsibility: States may be legally
responsible for acts that qualify as human rights violations and which
are also international crimes but such breaches are not of a criminal
nature. Such soft-pedaling is also indicative of the reluctance of States
to agree to a strong enforcement regime. At the drafting of the UN
Charter, States rejected proposals to make their commitment to
protecting human rights legally binding or to include an enforcement
mechanism like an international court.97 Equally telling is that
powerful States defeated such initiatives, motivated by self-interest to
insulate themselves from justice demands at home.98 These same
debates resurfaced at the Commission during the drafting of the
UDHR. Again, States turned down proposals to make the document a
legally binding instrument and to establish a court to enforce it.
Supporters of stronger measures argued these were needed to ensure
that States could no longer look on as they did when Nazi Germany
engaged in wholesale persecution of its own citizens, and argue that
those were internal issues not of international concern.99 Yet, such
statements failed to persuade the postwar great power States to agree
to greater oversight.

96. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 114-41 (2d
ed., 2005).
97. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 38-39.
98. Id. European colonial powers did not want to confer rights on colonial subjects, the
United States sought to insulate its “Jim Crow” laws from international scrutiny, and Stalin
had no desire to extend rights to prisoners in the Soviet gulag. Jochen von Bernstorff, The
Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic
Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903, 907-08 (2008)
(“The allied powers, however, never had intended to grant the protection of human rights a
central role in the institutional set up of the new world organization. Washington had an
unfavourable domestic non-discrimination record, not just regarding African Americans;
Moscow had established a highly repressive régime; and London had no interest in closer
international scrutiny of its policies in the colonies.”).
99. French delegate Rene Cassin supported article 28, which guaranteed a just
international order “in the hope of avoiding a repetition of what happened in 1933, when
Germany began to massacre her own nationals and when other nationals refused to consider
this a matter of international concern.” Quoted in ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 43; G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 28 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone is
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
declaration can be fully realized.”).
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In other words, States may violate individual human rights, but
the enforcement system at the international level is relatively weak.100
In this context, UN treaty bodies and other international instruments
interpreting the content of State human rights obligations and the
legal consequences for their breach have developed jurisprudence on
the State duty to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for
committing human rights violations that are also codified as criminal
acts.101 This “duty to prosecute and punish” is now firmly established
in human rights law.102 Normatively powerful, it dovetails with
international criminal law’s liberal focus on individual culpability for
atrocities. In this regard, the objective of both human rights and
international criminal law is to punish individuals. Because legal
culpability or guilt is reserved exclusively for individual actors, the
role of the State in perpetration of mass violence is not characterized
as criminal. In fact, the logic of the duty to prosecute is that it will end
impunity of individual wrongdoers and promote rule of law. In so
doing, States may burnish their image as law-abiding nations and the
determination of their own guilt is not the object of legal investigation
and justice discourse.
Nevertheless, unlike international criminal law, under human
rights law State responsibility attaches to the State’s separate breach
of its human right obligations that occur in the commission of Stateperpetrated atrocities. In other words, State responsibility attaches for
a State’s violation of the victims’ substantive human rights
protections (e.g. prohibition of torture) as well as the State’s failure to
investigate, prosecute, and punish offenders.103 Human rights

100. This is not to say the UN treaty system is ineffective and many have chronicled its
success in spurring changes in state behavior as well as contributing to an international culture
respectful of human rights and the rule of law. See e.g., PHILIP ALSTON, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1995).
101. These acts may be criminalized in domestic law, like murder, or prosecuted as
international crimes where states have incorporated such crimes into domestic law, or, in
theory under principles of universal jurisdiction, which give states the right to prosecute
certain international crimes. See G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, ¶¶ 3(b), 4, 5 (Dec. 16,
2005) [hereinafter Basic Principles].
102. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 5-8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug.
23, 2004).
103. Id. These breaches are of obligations to the individual and not to the international
community as a whole, which undercuts the normative value of pursuing state responsibility
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remedies for such violations offer opportunities to address structural
aspects of the State institutions that enabled the violations in the first
place. Remedies available to victims include measures of satisfaction
and guarantees of non-repetition.104 These remedies do important
work insofar as they address the contributing factors to State abuses
and generate a jurisprudence regarding the scope of State
responsibility for State acts that are also international crimes.
However, their application is inadequate when compared to the scale
of what is needed to remediate the harm caused by State-sponsored
mass violence and to eradicate the defects in the State institutions and
structures responsible.
International criminal law and human rights law are hampered
by the normative limitations of dual responsibility to name and
acknowledge State culpability for acts that constitute international
crimes and reflect liberalism’s insistence on individual and not
collective guilt. State legal responsibility for such acts is available
within human rights, but this recourse reinforces legal accountability
as individual. The transitional justice movement, which incorporates
human rights and international criminal law, frames the international
justice discourse on mass atrocities to exclude State culpability.105
The next section examines how this state of affairs has come to pass.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice is the dominant normative framework within
which international accountability for atrocities is discussed. While
debates within the field have been lively and dynamic, the concept of
State crimes does not figure in the discussion. More importantly, the
extent to which State accountability is raised, it emerges as a criticism
for human rights violations as opposed to state responsibility for violations of erga omnes
obligations.
104. Satisfaction includes state apologies and other forms of acknowledgment of its
failure to uphold human rights. Measures of non-repetition include reforms of state institutions
responsible for the abuses, etc. Dinah Shelton, Reparations, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 28 (2009); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches
to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351 (2007-08).
105. In addition, the liberal frame of the human rights regime, conceived as a regime of
individual rights realization, places limitations on its ability to fully respond to state
criminality. Such limitations include the individualized nature of human rights adjudication,
which places limits on its suitability to address mass violence.
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of international criminal accountability. Given that international
criminal accountability is part of a more general movement of
international justice that incorporates redress for broader social and
economic marginalization, it is a puzzle that the concept of State
crimes and State legal responsibility is absent from the discourse.
State culpability serves the accountability and rule of law agenda that
has driven the transitional justice field106 and the remedies for State
breaches could include measures to dismantle State institutions and
structures that enabled mass violence, which many transitional justice
advocates argue are necessary components of justice.107 Part of the
answer lies in the ways that transitional justice has theorized
accountability.
The dominant definition of transitional justice is that it refers to
the “conception of justice associated with periods of political change,
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of
repressive
predecessor
regimes.”108
International
criminal
accountability has emerged as the guiding principle for how
transitional justice conceives of legal accountability, with the ICC as
its leading institution. However, international criminal accountability
is only one tool among many that societies may employ as part of
transitional justice. Other initiatives include truth commissions,
vetting or lustration, locally based alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, memorials, etc. While international criminal law and
transitional justice are related areas of law and practice, their
relationship has evolved over time and remains subject to heated
debate. Because transitional justice started out as an accountability
project and has come to dominate discussions about how societies and
the international community should respond to mass violence, it is
important to examine the role of legal accountability in transitional
justice.
What does accountability mean, how it is prioritized, and why is
it important? This Section reviews the development of transitional
justice and then identifies how the concept of legal accountability
which includes but is larger than legal responsibility, operates within

106. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, infra note 124.
107. See infra note 211.
108. Ruti Teitel, Human Rights in Transition: A Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16
HARV. HUM. RTS J. 69, 70 (2003) [hereinafter Teitel, Human Rights in Transition].
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transitional justice discourse.109 This enables us to see how legal
accountability in transitional justice has come to mean processes that
lead to criminal responsibility. Those who argue that transitional
justice should pay greater attention to structural violence and drivers
of conflict have largely ignored pursuit of States as legally
accountable actors outside of the human rights regime. Although
positive law currently excludes penal sanctions against States,
reconceptualizing international State legal responsibility to
discursively acknowledge State culpability for mass violence would
align international remonstration against States with its treatment of
individuals. It would also invite renewed attention to how existing
remedies of State responsibility could be applied to reform or to
dismantle State institutions implicated in the perpetration of
international crimes.
This Section begins with a brief review of the origins and
development of transitional justice as the dominant frame to address
mass atrocities and repressive regimes. It then turns to characterizing
three primary strands of transitional justice thinking and how these
regard international criminal law. As the contours of the debates
within transitional justice become clear, the Section shifts to a
discussion of the implications for the state of the field.
A. Transitional Justice: An Overview
Transitional justice emerged as a concept in the late 1980s as
dictatorships in Latin America fell and the breakup of the Soviet
Union raised the question of how States transitioning to democracy
should address the past.110 Nuremberg was the legacy that transitional
justice supporters invoked to legitimate their goals; criminal trials
were thought to promote deterrence of mass bloodshed, represent the
triumph of law over violence, and symbolize the commitments of a
new regime to rule of law, and help consolidate emerging
democracies.111
109. Legal responsibility refers to the determination of a breach of an international
obligation while legal accountability refers to the broader processes by which a breach and
appropriate legal consequences are determined. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
110. ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON: PAPERS AND
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 4-6, 1988 (1989).
111. Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the
“Field” or “Non-Field,” 3 INT. J. TRANS. J. 5, 22 (2009) (“The word ‘justice’ in transitional
justice and the term’s origins in an attempt to develop legal accountability during transitions to
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In his opening speech at the Nuremberg trials, Justice Jackson
linked the liberal (individual) model of accountability with the goals
of deterrence and peace: “This principle of personal liability is a
necessary as well as logical one if international law is to render real
help to the maintenance of peace.”112 The link between criminal
accountability and peace gained traction and was consistent with the
policy preferences of early transitional justice proponents. In her
analysis of the origins of transitional justice in the late 1980s, Paige
Arthur argues that intellectuals guiding policy in successor regimes in
Latin America embraced a top-down, institutional reform approach in
part because alternative theories of democratization had been the
discredited: Marxism and the socio-economic development theories
of the 1960s.113 Transitional justice was associated with the goals of
rule of law, institutional reform to consolidate democracy, deterrence,
and social reconstruction.114
However, individual criminal accountability might not always be
feasible, for example where members or supporters of the former
regime held sufficient power to threaten the peace should trials
occur.115 In Eastern Europe, where State abuses were characterized
not by mass violence but by State surveillance, secrecy, and decades
of Communist governments that stifled dissent, the preferred policy
was to open up State archives and purge State bureaucracies of
democracy, have made law’s predominance difficult to disrupt.”); Paige Arthur, How
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice, 31
HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 332 (2009). Arthur dates the birth of transitional justice to the 1988 Aspen
Institute conference and argument by Jaime Malamud-Goti, one of the “chief architects” of
Argentine president Alfonsin’s prosecution policy, who summarized the thinking at the time as
follows: “We agreed with the view that trying the perpetrators in the military of the worst
crimes would contribute to the consolidation of democracy by restoring confidence in its
mechanism” (citation omitted). See also Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note 108, at
70.
112. Opening Speech, supra note 26.
113. Arthur, supra note 111, at 337-38; Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note
108, 84-85 (“Even as the disparities between rich and poor associated with the free market
economy have grown, the impetus has been to resort increasingly to the transitional justice
discourse and a project that is to some extent backward-looking and limited to restoration.
Presently, the extent to which transitional justice has displaced other justice projects signals
chastened political expectations responding to the failed experiments of a not so distant past.”).
114. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 57.
115. For example, in Argentina, fear of the military led the new government to halt
further trials after a handful of former members of the military junta had been prosecuted, and
it passed amnesty laws in 1986 and 1987 that remained in place until 2005. George C. Rogers,
Argentina’s Obligation to Prosecute Military Officials for Torture, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 259, 262-67 (1989).
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officials who were implicated in repression.116 Yet criminal
accountability was the gold standard, and alternatives like truth
commissions and vetting were second best.
Initially, truth commissions were hailed as offering a measure of
state reckoning with the past in situations in which criminal trials
were not possible.117 Activists supported truth commissions, in part,
out of the belief that they provided an opportunity for the collection of
evidence that could be used eventually in criminal prosecutions.118
South Africa’s choice to forego pursuit of criminal trials and establish
a truth commission in 1995119 challenged the idea that the pursuit of
criminal accountability was the highest expression of transitional
justice. The South African model prioritized truth and reconciliation
over criminal accountability, in a political bargain justified in terms of
the country’s cultural values of Ubuntu, and expressed as restorative
justice.120 The South African example prompted new thinking about
which transitional justice mechanisms best supported social
reconstruction. Supporters of truth commissions pointed out that these
authoritative bodies performed work that fostered some of the goals
of transitional justice better than criminal trials. Truth commissions
could examine a wider range of issues than permitted by criminal
charges, for example the structural dimensions that contributed to the
bloodshed.121 In addition, they also could offer victims the
opportunity to narrate their experiences in ways not possible in a
criminal court, and to recommend measures to foster social and
political change, including reparations to victims. Many understood
that criminal trials and truth commissions were not necessarily in a
binary relationship; they each prioritized different goals and had
116. UNITED NATIONS, WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? A BACKGROUNDER 1
(2008),
http://www.un.
org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/justice_times_transition/26_02_2008_background_note.pd
f.
117. See PRICILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2nd ed. 2010).
118. Laurel E. Fletcher, Editorial Note, 9 INT’L. J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1 (2015);
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, at 4-6 in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE (Naomi RohtArriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena, eds. 2006) [hereinafter BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE].
119. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.).
120. DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999).
BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 4; MARTHA MINOW,
121.
BETWEEN JUSTICE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS
VIOLENCE (1999).
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distinct roles to play.122 Similarly, in some countries, like Rwanda and
East Timor, State authorities employed alternatives to criminal trials
as a means to provide a way for lower-level offenders to make
amends for their wrongdoing and be accepted back into local
communities.123
By 2004, transitional justice practices had proliferated and
become a widely accepted feature, if not fixture, of international
policy. The UN Secretary-General released his report “The Rule of
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies.”124 The title reflects a broadening of temporal span for
transitional justice mechanisms.125 Indeed, the first ICC indictments
were issued against Ugandan rebels in an on-going armed conflict.126
The report endorses a pluralistic approach to mechanisms of
transitional justice and cautions against “one-size-fits-all formulas.”127
While the report affirmed a commitment to criminal accountability,
the ineligibility of amnesties for international crimes, and the rights of
victims, it also accepted that transitional justice interventions required
local legitimacy to contribute to peace, stability, and the rule of law.
The document ratified the essential paradigm and mechanisms of

122. Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, at 8-13 in BEYOND
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118.
123. See Patrick Burgess, A New Approach to Restorative Justice: East Timor’s
Community Reconciliation Process, in BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118, at
176; Timothy Longman, Justice at the Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda, in BEYOND
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 206. Scholars have also criticized these initiatives
for not meeting their goals to promote social reconstruction and, in some instances, of
exacerbating tensions. See also Janine Natalya Clark, Reconciliation through Remembrance?
War Memorials and the Victims of Vukovar, 7 INT’L J.TRANS. JUST. 116 (2013).
124. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice].
125. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established
during the conflict in the Balkans, and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued its first
arrest warrants against the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel organization
operating at that time in northern Uganda and notorious for kidnapping children and attacking
villages. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, A POISONED CHALICE? LOCAL CIVIL
SOCIETY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S ENGAGEMENT IN UGANDA (Oct.
2011) [hereinafter A POISONED CHALICE?].
126. In fact, the issuance of ICC arrest warrants was subject to sharp criticism that the
court derailed on-going peace negotiations. A POISONED CHALICE?, supra note 125, at 1.
127. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124.
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transitional justice and this framework for policy and intervention has
not changed significantly.128
B. Conceptions of Accountability in Transitional Justice
Thus the question remains: what is the relationship of legal
processes of accountability to transitional justice? Three strands of
thought or models for this relationship emerge from the transitional
justice literature and will be referred to, respectively as “the
Nuremberg” or “absolutist accountability” model, the “hybrid
accountability” model, and the “grafted accountability” model. These
various approaches are loosely chronological, reflecting the evolution
of thinking on transitional justice over the last 20 years. But these
strands should not be taken as a precise chronology or historiography
of the topic as traces of concepts that are dominant in early periods
appear in later conceptualizations and vice versa. These various
conceptualizations are intertwined or coexist, rather than being neatly
segregated along a linear trajectory. Nevertheless, each of these ideas
has been more prevalent during certain periods over this timespan.
Moreover, the models outlined below are presented in their idealized
forms to identify their theorized relationships of accountability to
transitional justice and thus should not be taken as descriptions of
their operation.
The contestation of the proper place for criminal accountability
in addressing mass atrocity and repression has led to three primary,
and currently co-existing ideas about the relationship of international
criminal law to transitional justice. Yet each model eschews state
legal responsibility, either because understands legal accountability as
individual criminal responsibility (Nuremberg/absolutist) or because
it excludes state legal responsibility in favor of victim-centered, or
process-based initiatives (hybrid and grafted). Hybrid accountability
and grafted accountability embrace a broader conception of
accountability beyond individual international criminal accountability
and do so from a so-called victim-centered approach. This perspective
views legalism and legal solutions skeptically. These models rely on
state accountability as a policy goal to promote good governance or,
as configured by human rights law, as a remedy. These debates also

128. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634 (Oct. 12, 2011).
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obscure the potential that pursuing explicitly an agenda of state legal
accountability could deliver discursively and, ultimately, practically.
1. Nuremberg/Absolutist Accountability Model
As Ruti Teitel observed, the Nuremberg trials reflect the
“triumph of transitional justice within the scheme of international
law.”129 Societies would not simply “turn the page” on a violent past,
they would forthrightly reckon with it through the prism of
international criminal law. Accountability in the Nuremberg model is
specifically individual criminal accountability. And this form of legal
accountability is justified by universal moral and legal principles as
well as the instrumental goals of supporting peace, democratization,
and human rights. In other words, accountability is both a means and
an end to be pursued. Mass violence in an increasingly globalized
world makes a moral demand on the international community to
respond not just because bloodshed may threaten world peace, but
also because such acts are an affront to humanity, a threat to universal
values. As captured in the Secretary-General’s report on transitional
justice, the rise of international criminal accountability represents “a
growing shift in the international community, away from a tolerance
for impunity and amnesty and towards the creation of an international
rule of law.”130
Legal accountability gains considerable traction because positive
law frames the violence as international crimes, which trigger legal
obligations of retributive justice. This approach is perhaps most
clearly laid out in Diane Orentlicher’s 1990 article in the Yale Law
Journal, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime.”131 At the time of her writing, the state
duty to investigate and prosecute individuals for perpetrating certain
international crimes was codified in international humanitarian law as
grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions, the crime of genocide
under Genocide Convention, and torture in the UN Convention
Against Torture.132 These treaty obligations predate the rash of post129. Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note 108, at 70.
130. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶ 40.
131. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
132. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Fourth Geneva Convention) art. 50, 51, 130, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (referring
to grave breaches); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
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Nuremberg international criminal tribunals and courts, and serve as an
important reminder that individual accountability is embedded in the
international rule of law framework.
Nevertheless, the ad hoc criminal tribunals and the ICC have
supplied an even more elaborate legal articulation of international
criminal law relative to other interventions. The international criminal
justice institutions are not outliers within the international system, but
rather mascots of its transitional justice approach. The UN transitional
justice policy, numerous statements of principle, and the institutional
commitments to human rights affirm criminal accountability as a state
duty and bedrock value.133 Moreover, with the creation of a standing
international criminal court, justice for Rome Statute violations may
be pursued during conflict. This development blurs the temporal
boundaries of transitional justice (justice begins with the violation,
not with the political transition) and raises the question of whether
transitional justice and individual criminal accountability fuse as a
practical matter.134
The Nuremberg accountability model relies on legal positivism
to legitimate prosecutions and is associated with those who argue in
favor of international relations and policy based on adherence to
principles and rules. The justice supporters or “idealists” argue that
accountability is not a policy option, but a universal obligation; in
contrast “realists” hold that justice should not be an absolute value but
that achieving stability should be the primary goal in ending conflict
and that there may be prudential reasons to compromise justice to
achieve peace.135 Thus the international criminal prosecutors have
defended their pursuit of justice in the face of criticism that doing so
art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
133. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶¶ 38, 49; Diane Orentlicher
(Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity), Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights: Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102 (Feb. 18, 2005); G.A.
Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005); Pablo de Greiff (Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of Non-recurrence), Report of the
Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/56 (Aug. 27, 2014).
134. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶ 2 (noting that the purpose
of the report is to highlight lessons learned of the UN’s pursuit of justice and rule of law in
conflict as well as post-conflict situations).
135. Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of
International War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI 345, 346
(2004).
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risked igniting conflict136 or jeopardizing ongoing peace
negotiations.137
Accountability in this model also is related to the larger goal of
ending impunity for serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. This goal applies more broadly than
transitional justice contexts, as such acts do not always occur as part
of armed conflict or as part of governance by authoritarian regimes.
Nevertheless, within transitional justice, the absolutist model of
accountability serves as a principled sword forging calls for criminal
accountability as well as a shield to block efforts to compromise on
justice.138 For example, the duty to prosecute serious human rights
violations may not be defeated by amnesties and so advocates may
rely on this obligation to expose efforts by governments to justify the
pursuit of reconciliation or restorative justice models as a cynical
attempt to evade redress of any kind.139
Finally, the Nuremberg model of accountability excludes
collective forms of sanction. Remember that part of the reason the
Allies decided to criminally prosecute the Nazi leaders was to
decouple the Nazi regime from the German state and to demonstrate
136. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Chief Prosecutor, Statement at the ICC on Indictments
of LRA Commanders During UN-Brokered Peace Negotiations 8 (Oct. 14, 2005),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2919856F-03E0-403F-A1A8-D61D4F350A20/277305/
Uganda_LMO_Speech_141020091.pdf (“The International Criminal Court was established to
demonstrate the determination of the international community to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of the most serious crimes. Civilians in Northern Uganda have been living in a
nightmare of brutality and violence for more than nineteen years. I believe that, working
together, we will bring justice, peace and security for the people of Northern Uganda.”).
137. For example, ICTY prosecutor Richard J. Goldstone was criticized for indicting
the self-styled Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic on the eve
of peace negotiations. INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PURSUING
JUSTICE IN ONGOING CONFLICT 3 (May 2007).
138. Kieran McEvoy, Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a “Thicker” Version of
Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE 15, 24 (Kiernan McEvoy & Lorna McGregor, ed. 2008)
[hereinafter TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW] (observing the movement of
accountability in transitional justice as follows: “In an environment where politicallyconstructed notions of ‘pragmatism’ and related offshoots such as reconciliation are often
viewed as slippery bywords for impunity, ‘human rights as retribution’ provides an
understandably comforting terra firma for many lawyers.”); Kieran McEvoy & Lorna
McGregor, Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy and Praxis, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW, at 18-19 [hereinafter McEvoy & McGregor, An
Agenda for Research].
139. Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts” Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms
with Local Agency, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 10, 21 (2007); see also Bell, supra note
111, at 16-17.
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that the German people as a whole were not on trial.140 The
Nuremberg theories of collective liability aimed to criminalize
associations (the Nazi party) and corporations have largely been
discarded in the 21st Century resurgence of international criminal
accountability.141 Notwithstanding the Allies’ pursuit of war
reparations, which from the perspective of the vanquished state have a
sanctioning character, the legal distinction between exacting
collective reparations and punishment seems to have held sway in the
Nuremberg theorization of accountability. Individual criminal
accountability defines accountability for past wrongs as a matter of
international law and morality.
2. Hybrid Accountability Model
With the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
the goals of transitional justice self-consciously broadened beyond
pursuit of justice and the role and shape of accountability underwent a
rethinking in the field.142 The second conceptualization of
accountability fits within what is termed a ‘holistic’ approach to
transitional justice. In this framework individual criminal
accountability is only one of many goals that transitional justice aims
to accomplish. State responsibility for human rights obligations
figures as a justification for a victim-centered approach. In the holistic
model, laid out in the 2004 Secretary-General report, pursuit of justice
is not necessarily the only or highest goal, but is one that needs to be
pursued in a balanced way along with truth recovery, reparations for
victims, preserving the peace, and building democracy and the rule of
law.143 The oft-quoted tagline from the Secretary-General’s report
140. See supra note 16.
141. Nina H.B. Jorgensen, Criminality of Organizations Under International Law, in
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 201-02.
142. See Bell, supra note 111, at 9, 13-24 (arguing that transitional justice grew to
cover more than human rights accountability in democratic transitions “to a broader
conception of transition involving a range of legal regimes and mechanisms, as well as a
complex set of goals beyond those of ‘accountability’ and ‘democraticization’ . . . “); Pablo de
Greiff, Theorizing Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NOMOS, vol. LI, 31, 32
(2012). Teitel identifies this period as phase II in her transitional justice genealogy, in which
transitional justice is characterized as having an expanded aim of promoting reconciliation and
thus justice is instrumental to facilitate this desired result. In turn this meant adopting a more
capacious view of amnesty policies. Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note 108, at 7782.
143. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶ 25; Vinjamuri & Snyder,
supra note 135, at 352-53 (arguing that realists do not have a principled attachment to justice
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frames this approach as: “We must learn as well to eschew one-sizefits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead,
base our support on national assessments, national participation, and
national needs and aspirations.”144 Accountability is valued, but must
be pursued in an appropriate way, at an appropriate time.145
Thus the model of accountability associated with holistic
transitional justice is hybrid accountability: criminal prosecutions are
understood as legitimate, but non-retributive mechanisms are also
validated. The choice of interventions will depend on the context.
Hybrid accountability places criminal responsibility within the
broader influence of legalism in transitional justice and becomes
subject to critique as such. There is a line of transitional justice
scholarship that questions the pursuit of legal accountability as part of
a larger critique of the hegemonic influence of legalism in the field.
Adherence to legalism prioritizes the pursuit of legal solutions
after mass violence blind to the power of political and social contexts.
Political philosopher Judith Shklar elaborated this concept, drawing
insights by theorizing law as a faith-based system. She characterized
the root of this dilemma based on the fact that law as “an ideology [is]
. . . too inflexible to recognize the enormous potentialities of
legalism as a creative policy, but exhausts itself in intoning traditional
pieties and principles which are incapable of realization.”146 For
Shklar, adherence to legalism required trials at Nuremberg, but the
real value of prosecutions was not in applying rule of law in the
abstract but that in so doing, the trials contributed to consolidating
political and social support in postwar Germany for law rather than
violence as a tool to resolve social conflict.147
because “[i]n the evaluation of outcomes, the consequences of trials for the consolidation of
peace and democracy trump the goal of justice per se, since the future prospects for justice
depend on the establishment of social peace and unshakeable democratic institutions.”); Teitel,
Human Rights in Transition, supra note 108, at 77 (noting that in this period, transitional
justice moved beyond retributive justice and “included questions about how to heal an entire
society and incorporate diverse rule-of-law values, such as peace and reconciliation, that had
previously been treated as largely external to the transitional justice project. Accordingly, the
move away from judgment associated with the more complex and diverse political conditions
of nation-building.”).
144. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, summary.
145. Id. ¶ 21.
146. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 112
(1986).
147. Id. at 145 (stating that trials “promote legalistic values in such a way as to
contribute to constitutional politics and to a decent political system”); Samuel Moyn, Essay-
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In the hybrid accountability model, legalism assumes a more
negative character. Kieran McEvoy lays out a trenchant analysis of
the effects of legalism in transitional justice that includes but goes
beyond pursuit of accountability. Not only does legalism manifest as
individual criminal accountability, but, with it, the discourse of
human rights overshadows the contributions of other perspectives to
solving the complex problems of social reconstruction. Thus, legalism
lends itself to a “Western-centric” and top-down focus; it selfpresents . . . as apolitical; it includes a capacity to disconnect
from the real political and social world of transition through a
process of “magical legalism”; and finally it suggests a
predominant focus upon retribution as the primary mechanism to
achieve accountability.148

A groundswell of criticism of criminal prosecutions emerged
together with a more general resistance to legal approaches as the
dominant transitional justice response. Practitioners and researchers
working with or studying the effects of trials exposed the gaps
between the promise of international criminal justice and the
instrumental goals that prosecutions were supposed to achieve: rule of
law, reconciliation, healing to victims, etc. Studies chronicled
problems in implementation of justice that had unintended effects, for
example on victims who participated in proceedings but did not find
the promised “closure” or healing but rather disappointment.149
Research also offered a decidedly mixed empirical record as to
whether trials had a positive effect on reconciliation.150 The empirical
Review, Judith Shklar verus the International Criminal Court, HUMANITY: INT’L J. HUM.
RTS., HUMANITARIANISM & DEV. 473, 481 (2013).
148. Kieran McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of
Transitional Justice, 34 J. L. & SOC. 411, 421 (2007) (emphasis added). Kieran McEvoy and
Lorna McGregor also link the presence of positivism and legalism in transitional justice
scholarship in part to the institutionalization of transitional justice through tribunals and truth
commissions. “It is also perhaps precisely because transitions from conflict shine a harsh light
on the political and contingent nature of legality that legal formalism become the defensive
default position for many lawyers working in this field.” McEvoy & McGregor, An Agenda for
Research, supra note 138, at 18-19.
149. See generally ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF
JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE (2007).
150. The Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley has completed
several population-based surveys in conflict and post-conflict settings that indicate that
affected populations hold nuanced views of criminal accountability. See, e.g., P. VINCK & P.
PHAM, BUILDING PEACE SEEKING JUSTICE: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES
ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC (2010); P. PHAM & P. VINCK, TRANSITIONING TO PEACE: A POPULATION-BASED
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evidence buttressed skeptics of individual accountability, many of
whom advanced alternative visions of transitional justice that recentered the enterprise on victims.
An early advocate of this approach, legal scholar Martha Minow,
argued for victim-centered approaches to transitional justice and
understood that processes to foster reckoning with the past should
look beyond retribution for perpetrators and reframe attention on the
experience and needs of victims.151 Minow theorized this relationship
by comparing criminal trials to truth commissions, which reinforced
seeing these mechanisms as a binary choice between legal
accountability and its alternatives.152 The holistic framework and
experiences with how transitional justice mechanisms worked in
practice tempered this distinction. Supporters of a victim-centered
approach promoted the idea that all transitional justice mechanisms
should be responsive to victims’ experiences. Truth commissions,
often touted as victim-centered, could exclude or devalue the
experiences of categories of victims, or frame their experiences in
ways that elided important dimension of their victimization,153 just as
criminal courts could.154
Proponents of victim-centered transitional justice frequently rely
on human rights and other international positive law obligations to
argue that transitional justice mechanisms should be more responsive
to a whole range of victims’ demands.155 What adherents to this
conceptualization gain by this is to foreground the victim within what
SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND JUSTICE IN NORTHERN
UGANDA (2010); see also LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND
PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Walford, with Pierre Hazan eds.
2010).
151. MINOW, supra note 121; Vinjamuri & Snyder, supra note 135, at 357 (noting that
proponents of the model advocate for “a conception of justice that is centered on the survivors
and victims, not on retribution against the perpetrator.”).
152. MINOW, supra note 121.
153. For example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have been
criticized for hearing testimony from women that spoke only selectively about their
experiences of political violence. FIONA C. ROSS, BEARING WITNESS: WOMEN AND TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2003).
154. Harvey M. Weinstein, Victims, Transitional Justice and Social Reconstruction:
Who is Setting the Agenda?, in JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS: PERSPECTIVES ON RIGHTS,
TRANSITIONS AND RECONCILIATION (Inge Vanfraechem et al. eds. 2014); NICOLA HENRY,
WAR AND RAPE: LAW, MEMORY, AND JUSTICE (2011).
155. Wendy Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence,
3 INT’L J.TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009); Special Issue, Transitional Justice and
Development, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2008).
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is largely a State-centered approach to transitional justice by speaking
the language of the duties of States to individuals.156 Human rights
treaties generate duties of the States to individuals and in the context
of transitional justice, these include the duty to generate the truth,157
investigate, and punish gross human rights violations or serious
violations of humanitarian law,158 and to provide victims of such acts
with reparations.159 It is in the area of reparations that proponents of
victim-centered approaches most visibly rely on the international
legal standards to ground demands for transitional justice processes to
compensate victims, although other forms of reparations like
rehabilitation and institutional reform are also promoted.160 The rise
of victims’ rights within transitional justice is helped by the
international justice scheme established by the Rome Statute. The
ICC elevates attention to victims as right-bearers within international
156. Lorna McGregor, International Law as a “Tiered Process”: Transitional Justice
at the Local, National and International Level, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW,
supra note 138, at 47, 64 [hereinafter McGregor, International Law as a “Tiered Process”].
157. Diane Orentlicher, Report: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (Addendum), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 12 (Feb. 8, 2005); UN Human Rights Council, Res. 21/7: Right to the
Truth, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/L.16 (Sept. 24, 2012); G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, ¶ XI 22(b),
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter G.A. Res., Principles and Guidelines on the
Rights to a Remedy].
158. Committee on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 31 on the Nature
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Committee on Civil and Political
Rights, General Comment No. 31]; Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Impunity of
Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (June 26,
1997); Pablo de Greiff (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth,
Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, ¶ 100, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/56 (Aug.
27, 2014); Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee, Serbia and Montenegro, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/81/SEMO (2004).
159. Committee on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 31, supra note
158, ¶ 15; G.A. Res., Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy, supra note 157, ¶
I(2)(c); G.A. Res. 60/34, Annex, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power, ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 214, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34
(Nov. 29, 1985); see also Diane Orentlicher, Report: Updated Set of Principles for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (Addendum),
12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005).
160. THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE
REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed. 2009); REPARATIONS FOR
VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE
AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING (Carla Ferstman et al. eds. 2009); see also ELAZAR BARKAN,
“THE GUILT OF NATIONS”: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000).
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justice, within a legal scheme that incorporates elements of restorative
justice alongside retributive justice.161
Thus, Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf noted that adherence to
accountability as retributive justice occurred simultaneously with a
commitment to take victims seriously.162 Yet they observe that the
normative fealty to accountability that grounded transitional justice
resisted challenges that would seriously displace accountability as the
driving principle of the field.
This phase of transitional justice is marked not only by a
fascination with locality, but also by a return to Nuremberg’s
international norms against impunity and a UN prohibition against
granting amnesties for war crimes. Although policymakers and
scholars now routinely recognize the importance of adapting
mechanisms of transitional justice to local circumstances, such
adaptation tends to be conceptualized in ways that do not modify the
foundational assumptions of transitional justice.163
The holistic model of transitional justice supports thinking about
accountability in a hybrid fashion. On the one hand, individual
criminal accountability remains an accepted fixture, anchored in
support of legal justice and law as the plumb line for societies
recovering from violent pasts. On the other hand, the holistic model
accommodates critics of criminal trials and legalism by expanding
what transitional justice includes. Yet even with this accommodation,
legal accountability remains present but in a new guise. Now, through
the pursuit of victim-centered transitional justice, the shortcomings of
State-centric and criminal accountability approaches are to be
addressed within a liberal framework that confers individual rights on
victims with concomitant duties of States.
3. Grafted Accountability Model
A new model of transitional justice is emerging. Although this
vision of transitional justice, or “transformative justice” as some of its
proponents have coined it,164 is the least developed, nonetheless its
161. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc A/Conf.183/9, arts.
68, 75, 79 (1998).
162. Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf, Introduction: Localizing Transitional Justice, in
LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 150, at 14, 17.
163. Id. at 24.
164. Paul Gready & Simon Robins, From Transitional Justice to Transformative
Justice: A New Agenda for Practice, 8 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 339 (2014); see also Erin
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essential contours are legible. This vision of accountability answers
Shaw’s and Waldorf’s challenges by offering a conception of
transitional justice based not in individual criminal accountability, or
primarily western liberal law, but in peacebuilding, restorative justice,
and development.165 In this third model, accountability is further
transformed. Accountability features primarily discursively and
operates to mobilize local, community-based action rather than as a
judicial enforcement strategy. It is focused on the State rather than on
individuals and is grafted onto a vision of broad, societal
transformation. Individual criminal accountability all but falls away,
and in its place social justice becomes the end goal of transition. The
hybrid model accepts criminal accountability and legal solutions as
legitimate, if flawed, initiatives that do some, but not all, of the work
transitional justice desires. Transformative justice starts from a
different premise. It looks first and primarily to local priorities and
processes to drive the form of transitional justice: law and
international law are not principles to which social responses should
hew.
Holding States accountable for the underlying acts of violence,
through its duty to prosecute individuals, is not the primary focus or
an acknowledged coterminous goal in transformative justice. In this
model, transitional justice ceases to be a State-centric project but one
that is bottom-up, participatory, endogenous, and designed to address
societal exclusion and marginalization. To some extent,
transformative justice is the outgrowth of victim-centered transitional
justice. In this iteration, however, the deployment of human rights
arguments is a strategic choice, born of opportunity. One gets the
sense that if non-legal tools could achieve similar ends, human rights
and law language would be dispensable. Criminal accountability is
not pursued as a matter of principle or even for its promised
consequential value as a State-building tool. If criminal accountability
for past violence emerges as a priority from a participatory and
consultative process it will be pursued, grafted onto a larger social
justice agenda.
Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 73 (2002).
165. Gready & Robins, supra note 164, at 350; Dustin N. Sharp, Interrogating the
Peripheries: The Preoccupation of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice, 26 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 149 (2013); McEvoy & McGregor, An Agenda for Research, supra note 138; James L.
Cavallero & Sebastian Albuja, The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth Commission in
Latin America and Beyond, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW, supra note 138.
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In their article, From Transitional Justice to Transformative
Justice: A New Agenda for Practice, Paul Gready and Simon Robins
lay out this new vision of transitional justice, which is an unabashed
effort to radicalize transitional justice politics and practice.166 While
they are not the only ones promoting a similar alternative, theirs is a
full-throated defense and emblematic of this approach. The authors
argue that transitional justice suffers from its limits as a set of legally
based, State-centric approaches, which aim to establish a liberal peace
after times of political violence or repression.167 Universal norms are
“too remote” and the holistic approach does not allow for truly
bespoke solutions. There is no mechanism to order priorities among
various options and attempts to address root causes and socioeconomic inequities are too narrow.168
Transitional justice praxis cannot break free of these limits
without offering a substantive critique of “the globally dominant
practices of which it is a part . . . .”169 The authors do so and seek to
address these constraints by promoting practices that will support
what they term transformative justice. They define transformative
justice as “transformative change that emphasized local agency and
resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived
outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power
relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the
global level.”170 Thus transformative justice seeks to shift the focus of
transitional justice from the attention to the legal dimensions of
transition to the social and political; from the State and its institutions
to the everyday experiences of residents; and to have change driven
by a bottom-up understanding and analysis of the lives and needs of
affected populations.171 Its tools will be broad and beyond trials and
truth commission to “comprise a range of policies and approaches that
can impact on the social, political and economic status of a large
range of stakeholders.”172
Gready and Robins share with others the push against the
dominance of criminal accountability for international crimes on the
166. Gready & Robins, supra note 164, at 340 (arguing that transformative justice
seeks to “radically reform [transitional justice] . . . politics, locus and priorities”).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 350.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 340.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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grounds that this approach privileges violations of physical integrity
(mass killings, torture, rape, etc.) and sidelines systemic violence and
socio-economic inequities that drive conflict.173 But the authors
broaden the frame in which they examine criminal accountability,
asking about its consequences not just for deterrence but also for the
impact that criminal prosecutions may have on the ability of fragile
States to deliver services.174 This model’s rejection of legalism allows
for a reconceptualization of transitional justice. In place of a normdriven and pluralist approach to the mechanisms of the holistic model,
the authors argue for a process-based, deliberative approach to
determining which mechanisms to adopt. Transformational justice is
inductive in developing policies and mechanisms, and includes
communities and affected populations in deliberations about priorities
and what is needed to redress systemic power imbalances that
undergird social injustice.175 Transformative justice does not presume
that application of individual criminal accountability for serious past
crimes is necessary as a matter of principle or that it will generate
desired long term change.
Consistent with a view of transitional justice as participatory and
reliant on and supportive of civic mobilization, judicial enforcement
of State accountability to victims as a matter of principle does not
drive transformative justice in the way that anti-impunity drives the
absolutist accountability model. Transformative justice draws support
from scholars who advocate for greater attention to economic
violence, economic justice, and structural drivers of conflict.176 While
human rights provide a universal, rights-based vocabulary and
framework for analysis of these issues, enforcement of the legal
obligations of the State as such is not always the goal of this model.
173. Id. at 345-48; Sharp, supra note 165, at 169-71.
174. Gready & Robins, supra note 164, at 345 (“A transformative approach will need to
balance pursuing wrongdoers with whatever best institutionalized peace and effective service
delivery, and as such it is likely that principle and pragmatism will cohabit in approaches to
institutions.”).
175. Id. at 357-58 (arguing that transitional justice needs to be holistic but beyond the
current tool kit to “use a far wider range of approaches, and will expressly integrate both social
and economic policy that promotes social justice, as well as grassroots-driven approaches that
impact directly on communities”); McEvoy & McGregor, An Agenda for Research, Policy and
Praxis, supra note 138, at 3; McGregor, International Law as a “Tiered Process”, supra note
156, at 47.
176. Special Issue, Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J.TRANSITIONAL.
JUST. (2008) (this issue includes articles that examine the relationship of non-legal frames to
transitional justice including economic and social inequalities and peacebuilding).
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Generating political pressure for policy reform is the avenue for
change. Some practitioners and researchers advocate that truth
commissions, the transitional justice mechanism generally tasked with
providing an authoritative account of the past violence, should
provide an explanatory account of how economic injustices
contributed to the violence and make recommendations for structural
reforms to cure these systemic defects.177 Similarly, Gready and
Robins argue that the human rights-based approach to development,
which is used as a prescriptive guide to a bottom-up process to
generate policy and practice in this area, should be incorporated as a
site of transformative justice.178
This approach is not, strictly speaking, advocating for legal
incorporation of economic rights as defined by international law.179 It
is an effort to draw attention and generate political support to attack
systemic inequalities in transitional justice contexts. This human
rights discourse is one used to diagnose and redress economic
violence. It possesses a rights-based sensibility and adopts a more
expansive understanding of “justice” than that defined by criminal
accountability. Here the concept of State accountability is not figured
as legal accountability for human rights obligations but as political
and moral accountability, in the sense of democratic political theory
that understands States as accountable to their citizens for securing
their welfare.
However, legal accountability is not wholly absent in this grafted
model of accountability. It presents itself primarily in calls for
reparations. Transformative justice overlaps with victim-centered
approaches to transitional justice in that both justify reparations for
victims by appeals to human rights law and the duty of the State to
provide an effective and adequate remedy.180 However,
transformative justice finds unsatisfactory the legal remedy of
restitution to victims, which is the most common form of
177. Sharp, supra note 165; Cavallero & Albuja, supra note 165. Gready and Robins
note with caution that truth commissions may be too limited in their discussion of root causes
and note that the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Report limited its discussion to
land reform and did not raise larger issues of redistribution and tenure reform. Gready &
Robins, supra note 164, at 346-47.
178. Gready & Robins, supra note 164.
179. Evelyne Schmid & Aoife Nolan, “Do No Harm”? Exploring the Scope of
Economic and Social Rights in Transitional Justice, 8 INT’L. J.TRANSITIONAL JUST. 362, 363
(2014).
180. Gready & Robins, supra note 164, at 347.
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reparations.181 Narrowly prescribed for selective violations and
designed to restore the victim to her status quo ante, restitution as a
legal remedy is a relatively anemic form of economic justice.
Nevertheless, scholars argue that grassroots mobilization of victims
around demands for reparations serves other important goals that
support a broader social justice agenda including community
empowerment, rights conscientization, and strengthening grassroots
capacity to disrupt power imbalances.182
Transformative justice offers a wholesale reconfiguration of
transitional justice practice that is process driven rather than norm
driven. Aimed at addressing root causes of the violence, social
marginalization, and fostering social justice, law and legal solutions
are not presumed to provide the answers to achieving these goals.
Criminal accountability is balanced not against peace, but against the
capacity of the State to ensure the welfare of its citizens. Trials still
may be a tolerated component of transformative justice, but certainly
not a mainstay. Empowerment of subordinated groups is prioritized
with the focus on the future and building a more just society rather
than looking back at the past armed with retributive justice to settle
accounts. State accountability is also future-focused and largely
framed in the register of political theory of democratic government
rather than enforcement of human rights obligations. In other words,
unlike with the Nuremberg model, legal accountability is sidelined
and no longer central to the transitional justice project.
C. Implications of Transitional Justice Models of Accountability for
State Accountability
Transitional justice has constituted its views of accountability in
ways that exclude State criminality and have a limited understanding
of state accountability. The Nuremberg model is premised on the
rejection of state crimes and collective punishment. Those trials
served to identify the individual decision makers responsible for mass
violence and their guilt was hypothesized to liberate the German
people from the stigma of their former Nazi leaders. The liberal
discourse of the Nuremberg Principles omits war reparations and the
other interventions the Allies imposed on the German collective (e.g.
181.
182.

Id.
REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 160.
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economic and political restructuring) that functioned as stigmatization
or sanctioning of the State. Liberal accountability prevailed and
became imbricated with building rule of law and democracy in postconflict societies. Legalism so configured muzzles law’s power to
discipline states for their distinct role in mass violence.
Hybrid accountability imports the Nuremberg model but
expands the accepted goals and mechanisms to achieve transitional
justice to include non-retributive aims. The constraint or elision of
State sanctions for international crimes carries forward and the
holistic approach does not include any interventions to hold the State
legally accountable for mass crimes. The emphasis on victims,
prevalent in hybrid and grafted accountability, makes room for State
legal accountability insofar as it justifies reparations based on human
rights obligations. So why are reparations for human rights violations
and acknowledgment of State crimes, for which the imposition of
reparations could be as a consequence, not the same thing?
1. Human Rights Effaces State Responsibility to the International
Community
There is a normative distinction between State responsibility for
human rights violations and State responsibility for violations erga
omnes. The explicit shaming function of identifying the behavior of
the State as wrongful is missing from human rights reparations.
Analogous to the distinction in municipal law between criminal law
and civil law, actions to sanction the State for its role in the
commission of mass violence through human rights reparations
misses the moral opprobrium of penal sanctions. It is the lack of a
normative link between state conduct regarded as penal and
reparations that dilutes the power of reparations to instantiate a more
robust, universal value of accountability. Thus, the distinction
between the imposition of reparations as the result of action
characterized as State criminality versus human rights violations is
important. Additionally, although human rights principles influence
and may be incorporated into transitional justice thinking and
policies, these largely remain separate spheres of intellectual activity
and practice. The hybrid model borrows from human rights to the
extent that human rights principles supports victims’ rights, but is not
interested in developing the legal remedies of State responsibility
further as a practice to vindicate the interests of the international
community.
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Moreover, the move in transitional justice toward a victimcentered approach undermines attention to State criminality. In the
holistic model, scholars and practitioners identify and offer curative
fixes to address the shortcomings in how transitional justice processes
address the concerns and experiences of victims. At the same time,
the expanded goals of transitional justice to promote truth recovery
and social reconciliation are intertwined with victim-centeredness.
This reformist agenda largely accepts the transitional justice toolkit
but proposes ways that any particular initiative can better satisfy
victims. Thinking within the field that questions the appropriate role
and relationship of transitional justice to criminal accountability
pushes in the direction of attending to the individual and community
and away from the State. The reformist tendencies reject norms,
legalism, and a focus on States, overlooking what revisiting State
criminality might offer to the field. While this approach does not
necessarily—and certainly not explicitly—absolve the State of its
wrongdoings, it does not examine the contribution that State legal
responsibility could make to achieve desired change. In questioning
individual criminal responsibility, a revisiting of State accountability
and the role for legal responsibility is certainly necessary.
2. Human Rights Effaces Remedies for State Violations of Duties to
the International Community
Those writing in the field critique legalism but argue that
transitional justice should address the underlying causes of injustice
that produced the violence. They have a somewhat ambivalent
relationship to State accountability and State criminality.
Transformative justice looks to communities and individuals to
overcome the State-centric foundation of transitional justice. It is not
concerned with State criminality. More attractive is the human rights
framework, with its inclusion of participatory rights and substantive
protections, which offers a discursive lens that makes visible and
offers a framework to address structural violence. But the rights-based
approach in this area tends toward policy advocacy and political
mobilization and away from legal enforcement. This means that a
human rights perspective on economic harms can inform the work of
top-down mechanisms like truth commissions or community-based
interventions as policy guidance. But “hard” legal accountability of
the State figures only at the periphery. Scholars note that transitional
justice mechanisms, even when they frame economic injustice in
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terms violations of human rights, do not carry through on their
analysis by calling for legal remedies like individual or collective
reparations or structural reforms.183
Human rights establish remedies to victims. Yet victims do not
have universal opportunities to pursue judicial enforcement of
remedies for conflict-related human rights violations. There is no
international human rights court comparable to the ICC in which
victims might assert their rights—both civil and political rights as
well as economic and social rights—that States violate in perpetrating
mass violence. Even where human rights law provides for structural
remedies for human rights violations as a form of reparations called
“guarantees of non-repetition,” human rights courts have ordered
these comparatively rarely.184 Moreover, even the more muscular
forms of structural remedies ordered by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights are weaker than the wholesale State reforms of the
Potsdam Agreement.185 To be clear, these are important differences of
practice rather than law; international principles allow for structural
remedies to prevent recurrence of State-perpetrated atrocities.186 But
transitional justice’s theorization of remedies as human rights
violations shortchanges the power of international law. Remedies for
State violation of obligations owed to the international community
would arguably justify stronger measures than those drawn from
human rights practice. Moreover, enforcing remedies for erga omnes
violations align with the normative rule of law values of the
international community. Despite the call by the UN Special
Rapporteur on transitional justice for States to apply human rights
norms to craft policies that will address structures of marginalization
as part of transitional justice policy, enforcement of State
responsibility for perpetrating conflict crimes is an underdeveloped
area in transitional justice.187
In short, although accountability and the drive against impunity
for serious human rights violations and violations of international
183. Schmid & Nolan, supra note 179, at 376; Amanda Cahill-Ripley, Foregrounding
Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice: Realising Justice for Violations of Economic
and Social Rights, 32 NETH. Q.HUM. RTS. 183, 186, 207 (2014).
184. Gready & Robins, supra note 164, at 347. Yet transitional justice scholars who
argue for greater attention to addressing economic injustice in general do not justify these
claims on human rights obligations. See Sharp, supra note 165, at 171.
185. Antkowiak, supra note 104, at 351.
186. See discussion infra Part III.A.
187. de Greiff Report, supra note 22.
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humanitarian law remain central to the field of transitional justice, the
contestation and debates over the relationship of accountability to the
goals of the transitional justice has generated particular dynamics.
Among the three models of transitional justice, legal accountability is
associated with individual criminal accountability and rises and falls
with support for state-focused solutions. Evolution of the field has
generated alternatives to the Nuremberg model of an absolutist,
principled, application of international criminal accountability. But
neither the hybrid nor the grafted model lends itself to considering
State criminality. Attention to victims has entailed sharp critique of
top-down approaches, which draws attention away from the State as
legally responsible for redressing mass violence.
Despite tendencies away from state-centric and legal solutions,
transitional justice rests within the international, State-centric, world
order. The push toward victims and grounded solutions apparent in
the hybrid and grafted accountability models arises in the context of
State-generated international law and policy. This leads to questions
about the implications of turning our backs on the State as a focal
point of accountability when we look to formulating approaches to
restoring a full measure of justice in the face of mass atrocities. To
investigate this issue, the next Section examines current approaches
among international law scholars to state accountability for mass
violence. What can we glean from how scholars and States conceive
of State legal accountability and the role of the State in committing
atrocity crimes?
III. TOWARD STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MASS VIOLENCE
We return briefly to reconsider the opening frame of this Article:
the Security Council vote defeating the proposed referral of the
situation in Syria. An ICC referral encapsulates the absolutist
accountability model: the available evidence suggests the Assad
regime is carrying out widespread and lethal persecution of civilians,
which constitute crimes in international law, and those responsible
should be brought to justice.188 At the same time, the systematic and
organized nature of the violence points to the involvement of organs
of the State in the commission of these crimes. The armed forces
likely are the most visible, but civilian branches responsible for
governance, administration, and enforcement (or lack thereof) of State
188.

Supra note 1.
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protection of residents also are implicated in furthering the State’s
persecutory policy against (perceived) political opponents and their
(perceived) supporters. The proposed referral makes no mention of
legal measures against the State for its role in perpetrating mass
violence.189 This should concern us. For the elision of State legal
responsibility for mass violence means nothing less than State
impunity for acts that are considered criminal under international law.
The rule of law values of the international legal order are undermined
and the legitimacy of its institutions weakened by their glaring failure
to address the legal responsibility of its most consequential actors.190
This Section considers this State of affairs and asks what can be
done to bring international attention and action on legal accountability
for State propagation of mass violence. This exercise serves as an
invitation to transitional justice scholars and practitioners to consider
the value of legalism to advance State, as opposed to individual,
accountability. This Article does not propose a mechanism for
enforcement of State responsibility. Rather, it uses the Security
Council’s treatment of dual responsibility in the case of atrocities
committed in Sudan to illustrate how the prevailing theories of
accountability operate and how the Security Council as one
international institution could advance state legal responsibility.
This analysis suggests that the theorization of legal
accountability in transitional justice undercuts State accountability.
Legal accountability for State atrocities poses a challenge to the
absolutist accountability model by insisting that there is a collective
dimension to international crimes that the law should not ignore. At
the same time, deployment of international law to promote State
accountability challenges the hybrid and grafted accountability
models of transitional justice. To the extent that these two models
reject legalism for its inability to address structural dimensions of
mass violence, State responsibility offers a fuller legal response than
either of these models contemplates. Given the weak level of
development and enforcement of the international law of State
189. Rep. of the S.C., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (2014) (“condemn[ing]” Syrian
authorities’ “widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” and
“urg[ing] all States . . . to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor”).
190. See Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Complementarity Between State
Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: The Crime
of State Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY 253, 269 (Maurizio Ragazzi
ed. 2005).
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responsibility,191 the argument advanced here is that international law
regarding the responsibility of States for mass violence should be
cultivated by transitional justice for its conceptual and rhetorical
value. Doing so has the potential to change the international politics
surrounding debates on international accountability for mass violence.
The past 25 years have shown the power of international justice
discourse to change international responses to mass violence.
Expanding the discourse to including State accountability could lead
to a more integrated theory and enforcement strategy of dual
responsibility for atrocities.
This Section proceeds as follows: First, international law
scholarship regarding the law of state responsibility for State crimes is
mined for its conceptual contributions to advancing State
accountability for these acts, namely acknowledgement of State
criminality within international law, thinking about appropriate
remedies for State crimes, and illustrating the problem of
enforcement. Second, the effects of the status quo are outlined in an
effort to juxtapose the costs of today’s equilibrium against the need to
revise current thinking. Finally, the Section considers how transitional
justice might incorporate state accountability for mass violence into
its agenda.
A. The Contribution of International Law Scholarship to State
Accountability for Mass Violence
International legal scholars have studied the problem of mass
violence from the perspective of the legal responsibilities of States, as
opposed to the legal responsibilities of individuals. In so doing, they
offer transitional justice a set of ideas regarding legal accountability
that the field has not adequately considered. Mass violence creates a
dilemma in international law, of which its difficulty to address State
involvement in such horrors is, perhaps, its most visible symptom.
Nuremberg rejected collective guilt. Nevertheless, as an empirical
matter, the apparatus of the State will be utilized in the commission of
State-perpetrated mass violence. Under the concept of “dual
responsibility,” States may be legally responsible for such crimes and
their legal responsibility is distinct from criminal sanctions against

191.

See supra Part I.
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individuals for their role in the same events.192 This legal
responsibility of States is not of a penal nature as technically States do
not commit crimes.193 Making system criminality more difficult to
address is the fact that although the international law of State
responsibility establishes rules to determine breaches and the legal
consequences of these act, the processes of enforcement—a system of
legal accountability—are underdeveloped.194 Transitional justice
drove the momentum to establish mechanisms of accountability for
international criminal law, but has not incorporated calls for State
legal accountability. Many international law scholars have
acknowledged this state of affairs as a shortcoming of positivist law
and have offered conceptual contributions that deepen an
understanding of the nature of this gap as well as ideas for reform.195
Andre Nollkaemper develops the idea of system criminality to
capture “the phenomenon that international crimes—notably crimes
against humanity, genocide and war crimes—are often caused by
collective entities in which the individual authors of these acts are
embedded.”196 He shares with others a concern that the “current
fashionable focus”197 on international criminal law neglects that for
most international crimes, either by definition (crimes of
aggression)198 or as a practical matter,199 the State is directly involved

192. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 116, ¶ 173 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter ICJ
Genocide Case].
193. Id. ¶ 170; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on Request of Rep. of Croatia for
Review of Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997) (“Under present international law it is clear that States, by
definition, cannot be the subject of criminal sanctions akin to those provided for in national
criminal systems.”).
194. Outside of Genocide Convention, and the Geneva Conventions, there is no treaty
law regarding state accountability for international crimes. These treaties are multi-lateral,
relying on the state that suffered the injury to pursue a remedy and thus do not develop a law
or practice for violations of ergo omnes obligations.
195. See generally SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6.
196. Id. at 1.
197. Andre Nollkaemper & Harmen Van Der Wilt, Conclusions and Outlook, in
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 338.
198. ICC, Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression (June 11, 2010).
199. SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 4 (“when [state authorities] have a
powerful apparatus at their disposal charged with protecting the security of the state, and when
they have identified groups that are defined as enemies of the state, collective entities
themselves can turn into actors that commit, or further the commission of, international
crimes”); Nigel D. White, Responses of Political Organs to Crimes by States, in SYSTEM
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in their commission.200 And as a normative as well as instrumental
matter, States should be held to account for their actions, including
being punished for breaching established norms.201 The work of these
scholars prompts an important discussion about how and under what
conditions international State legal accountability addresses system
criminality and its relationship to international criminal law.
However, these debates are largely confined to discussions among
international law and international criminal law scholars.202
Transitional justice scholars, even those who are most concerned with
a holistic approach to reconstruction after mass violence, are not
considering the contribution of State responsibility.203 Thus the
differentiated development of the relevant branches of international
law is mirrored in transitional justice. Cross-fertilization—or more
precisely, integrating international law into transitional justice—
yields new insights into the nature of the accountability gap and the
way in which transitional justice contributes to it. What international
law adds is a legal (as opposed to political) understanding of State
responsibility
and
individual
criminal
responsibility
as
complementary systems, both of which are needed to promote a fuller
measure of accountability for atrocity crimes.204 Transitional justice
has focused on legal accountability for individuals and needs to
consider what State responsibility offers both as a normative and
practical matter.

CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 315; System Effects of International Responsibility, supra note
2, at 314-17.
200. G.P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem
of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).
201. Gerry Simpson, Men and Abstract Entities: Individual Responsibility and
Collective Guilt in International Criminal Law, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 69,
74; White, supra note 199, at 315; Cançado Trindade, supra note 190, at 268 (arguing that
international law without legal recognition of crimes of state “will be depriving the State—
hostage of a deformed structure of repression and impunity—of its proper end, the realization
of the common good”).
202. A good example of this is the list of contributors to and the discussion topics of the
recent System Criminality edited volume. SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6.
203. See infra Part II.
204. System Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 337 (2010) (citing
Cançado Trindade, supra note 190, at 259: “compartmentalized conception of international
responsibility— of States and individuals—leads . . . to the eradication of impunity in only a
partial way”); White, supra note 199, at 315; Brunée, supra note 11, at 42 (noting that absent
primary norms that are erga omnes or treaty rules that create them, states have few options to
hold other states accountable for human rights violations).
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1. The Normative Contribution of State Responsibility to Transitional
Justice
From the perspective of transitional justice, international law
scholars have addressed two aspects of particular interest: (1) the
conceptualization of State responsibility and (2) concomitant
international law remedies that address the underlying or systemic
drivers of mass violence. The Draft Articles of State Responsibility
recognize guarantees of non-repetition and measures of satisfaction as
some of the legal consequences for States that breach international
obligations.205 Scholars have observed that such measures afford the
opportunity to advance as a normative, if not as a formal legal matter,
state culpability for atrocity crimes.206 For example Antonio Cançado
Trindade has argued that non-pecuniary obligations like reforming
police or the judiciary “can be regarded as being endowed with a
character at a time compensatory and punitive (containing elements of
both a civil and a penal nature).”207 Andrea Gattini, looking at
historical practices of guarantees of non-repetition, argues that the
demilitarization and redrawing of national territory of Germany
technically may be guarantees of non-repetition (and therefore nonpunitive and forward looking) but their very imposition suggests State
criminality. In other words, why else would the Allies have imposed
such measures if not because of the Nazi horrors were of such an
egregious nature as to justify these severe consequences?208 Thus the
remedies for State responsibility, in particular guarantees of nonrepetition, convey the moral opprobrium against States akin to the
penal sanction of individual international criminal responsibility.

205. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 80, arts. 30 (b) and 34; see
Andreas Zimmermann & Michael Teichmann, State Responsibility for International Crimes, in
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 298-313 (analyzing legal responsibility for “state
criminality” as serious breaches of peremptory norms).
206. Andre Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State
Responsibility in International Law, 52 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 616, 625 (2003) (arguing that the
systemic nature of breaches of peremptory norms may need to have consequences for the type
of remedies: “It would be odd were the international community to consider that a president of
a state should have to be imprisoned for many years, whilst leaving in place the structures that
made possible and facilitated his acts.”).
207. Cançado Trindade, supra note 190, at 266; see also Systemic Effects of
International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 341.
208. Andrea Gattini, A Historical Perspective: From Collective to Individual
Responsibility and Back, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 101; see also Systemic
Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 343.
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The fusion of international normative judgment with consequent
remedies for system criminality offered by pursuit of State
responsibility for atrocity crimes furthers the aims of transitional
justice in important conceptual and practical ways. Accountability for
international crimes is a bedrock international principle around which
the United Nations has organized international transitional justice
policy.209 Rule of law ideals—that no one should be above the law—
have thoroughly infused the international justice discourse. Yet
international rule of law ideals apply equally to States. In fact,
international rule of law is arguably the organizing principle of the
postwar international legal system. So when, in the name of
accountability for international crimes, transitional justice effectively
ignores State legal responsibility, transitional justice undermines the
international commitment to rule of law.
In the case of dual responsibility, States commit not just
wrongful acts, but violate norms of the highest order—genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes—and obligations owed to the
international community as a whole. Such transgressions deserve to
be acknowledged as such. State-perpetrated mass slaughter of
civilians is conducted in furtherance of a State policy, and relies on
multiple collective dimensions of the State to advance this criminal
pursuit. To the extent that transitional justice pursues international
criminal sanctions, these acts when carried out by States also should
be identified as wrongs, and offending States should be held
accountable.210 Further, the symbolic value of international justice for
mass atrocities should not be underestimated: it is an international
legal acknowledgment of wrongdoing and an enactment of the
international commitment to rule of law and justice. Instead of
pursuing State legal responsibility, transitional justice pursues legal
justice as accountability for individual crimes. The final version of the
Draft Articles, while stripped of formal acknowledgment of State
crimes, leaves a normative and legal framework upon which
transitional justice can build.

209. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124.
210. These reasons are typically retribution, truth recovery, promotion of rule of law,
reconciliation, and responding to needs of victims. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 57, at
586.
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2. The Remedial Contribution of State Responsibility to Transitional
Justice
In addition to the normative importance of promoting State
accountability, the international law on State responsibility offers
transitional justice a legal basis to pursue remedies advocates have
argued need to be secured to ensure victims a full measure of justice
and post-conflict societies a sustainable peace. Remedies for State
violations of international obligations include compensation and
guarantees of non-repetition. The legal obligation of States to provide
compensation to victims of atrocity crimes has received considerable
attention from transitional justice advocates211 and dovetails
developments in human rights norms that advance enforcement of
individual rights.212 The remedy of compensation, however, does not
attend to the collective dimensions of the State that furthered atrocity
crimes.
Guarantees of non-repetition are forward-looking remedies,
which can include measures that dismantle State institutions, laws,
and systems that contribute to and make it possible for the State to
institute mass violence. However, as developed in the postwar
international legal order, the types of measures international judicial
bodies have ordered bear little resemblance to the far-reaching
political, legal, and economic reforms that the Allies imposed on
Germany and Japan. The International Court of Justice has ordered
guarantees of non-repetition rarely213 and its practice in this regard
pales in comparison to that developed by human rights courts, notably
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Human rights norms
offer a legal source for the types of measures that could be used in an
interstate context to address collective dimensions of mass violence,
for example, measures to promote public memory of the victims,214
reform laws to prevent military jurisdiction over civilians,215 but these
have not been used in the judicial resolution of interstate disputes.216

211. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
212. Basic Principles, supra note 101.
213. Gattini, supra note 208, at 110.
214. Arturo J. Carrillo, Justice in Context: the Relevance of Inter-American Human
Rights Law and Practice to Repairing the Past, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo
de Greiff ed., 2006); Antkowiak, supra note 104.
215. Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4, ¶ 166 (May
30, 1999).
216. Id. at 123; Cançado Trindade, supra note 190.
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The consensus among international law experts is that the law and
practice of State responsibility is underdeveloped in this regard.217
But the postwar practice in this regard should not define the
parameters for the ways in which guarantees of non-repetition can be
used as a remedy for system criminality. UN Special Rapporteur on
transitional justice Pablo de Greiff, the top UN expert advancing
international transitional justice law and policy, incorporates this
remedy as one of the four pillars of transitional justice.218 De Greiff
proposes a range of measures that States should pursue to address
system criminality that has produced mass violence including,
ratification of human rights treaties and treaties pertinent to serious
violations of humanitarian law; domestic legal reforms to criminalize
offenses of international criminal law; judicial reforms to promote an
independent and effective judiciary; and, constitutional reforms
necessary to promote individual rights, prohibit discrimination,
advance civilian control of the armed forces, and ensure separation of
powers.219 Of these, the constitutional reforms are the most ambitious
proposals and in these one sees the echoes of measures imposed on
Germany. The Allies’ immediate aims were to dismantle the
discriminatory laws of the Nazi regime, revamp the judicial system,
and reestablish a representative democracy.220 Similarly, De Greiff
recommends States strike down discriminatory laws, adopt bills of
rights, and limit excessive executive powers.221
We see in both examples an attention to remedy the what, how,
and why of system criminality. Discriminatory laws create and
entrench disparate treatment, fueling social unrest; weak judiciaries
mean that residents cannot seek enforcement of rights; and abuse of
power by other branches of the State or the unchecked power of
criminal enterprises facilitate systemic abuse and State policies of
217. Andre de Hoogh has argued for more robust remedies for state crimes, favoring an
obligation of offending state “to change its government, to change its constitution to the extent
necessary, and to hold free elections so as to prevent the recurrence of criminal acts.” ANDRE
DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 195, 197 (1996);
Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 343; Mark Drumbl, Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocities, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
576 (2005). But see Andreas Zimmermann & Michael Teichmann, State Responsibility for
International Crimes, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 298, 301.
218. The others are the rights to truth, justice, and reparations. de Greiff Report, supra
note 22.
219. Id.
220. Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9, at II.A. 4, 8, 9.
221. de Greiff Report, supra note 22, ¶¶ 63, 65, 69.

514

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:447

violent persecution. Thus, reversing constituent aspects of system
criminality serves to (re)create the institutional conditions for social
justice and respect of human rights. These are vital components and
goals of transitional justice. More to the point, these are remedies that
international criminal justice and international human rights
mechanisms cannot provide.222
3. Evaluation of International Transitional Justice Remedies: Law
Versus Policy
The Special Rapporteur’s focus on guarantees of non-repetition
draws attention to the aspects of the transitional justice agenda that
seek to remedy “root and branch” problems that contribute to mass
violence and hamper peace. However, the expert proposal is cast as
one of policy, not law, and relies on human rights rather than
international (interstate) law practice and principles to advance its
claims.223 States are being asked to adopt systemic interventions to
prevent recurrence of mass violations, but international law and
commitments to rule of law arguably requires them to do so. Leaving
aside consideration of whether law or policy is the better tool, the
relevant question for this inquiry is what does it mean for transitional
justice to omit the international law of State responsibility?
One effect is that human rights law and mechanisms are used as
the examples and conceptual building blocks for transitional justice
policy in this area. Caution is warranted. Human rights law is being
asked to address collective dimensions of State-sponsored violence
through a system designed for another purpose: protection of
individual rights. Despite broad interpretations of the human rights
duties of the state to effect a system of governance so that it is capable
of “juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human
rights,”224 this is not universally accepted, let alone elaborated with
regard to dual responsibility. Additionally, in many parts of the world
victims do not have access to an international judicial enforcement
mechanism for human rights, even if this branch of international law
and practice were to become the universal site for redress of mass
222. Regional human rights courts do not provide a universal approach and their
practice, with notable exceptions, is modest in this regard. See infra notes 224-26 and
accompanying text.
223. de Greiff Report, supra note 22, ¶14, et seq.
224. Velasquez Rodriquez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser. C) No 4, ¶ 166
(July 29, 1988).
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violence.225 Regional human rights mechanisms play a vital role in
norm diffusion with regard to state duties to prosecute international
crimes,226 yet there are other important considerations that militate in
favor of keeping the development and enforcement of state remedies
for mass violence outside of the human rights system.
4. Location and Enforcement of State Responsibility
Where should transitional justice law and policy be located
within the international system? In the main, transitional justice
scholars and advocates focus on the discursive and legal spaces of
international justice rather than on human rights. The international
community as a whole acts through the ICC Prosecutor to enforce
international criminal law. Similarly, as a normative matter, violations
of State obligations owed to the international community as a whole
should not depend on enforcement by individual victims within the
human rights system, but should be enforced on behalf of the
international system. As a practical matter, leaving enforcement of
State responsibility for system criminality to human rights
mechanisms further bifurcates dual responsibility into separate legal
and institutional spheres. To the extent that the human rights regime,
with the individual as the subject, is understood to be an exception to
international law of interstate relations, transitional justice risks losing
some of its potency by investing in human rights to address what is
fundamentally an international law problem.
This raises the larger issue of enforcement mechanisms for State
system criminality. While this Article does not advance a prescription
in this regard, a few observations are in order to provide context for
the conceptual contribution that State accountability can offer
transitional justice. Simply put, under the current international
structure, there is no juridical mechanism to hold States legally
accountable to the international community for system criminality.227
225. The Inter-American system has the most developed practice with regard to
ordering measures of non-repetition. There is no regional human rights mechanism for Asia
through which individuals may petition for judicial relief, and the African system is regarded
as weak relative to the European and Inter-American systems. See Thomas Buergenthal, The
Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J.INT’L L. 783, 800 (2006).
226. See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING THE WORLD (2011).
227. While there is an overlap between serious breaches of human rights obligations
and state violations of erga omnes obligations and violations of humanitarian law, the
interstate system of enforcement for international human rights treaty bodies is one of
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The system is a product of the power and preferences of States to
maintain sovereign equality and to address State involvement in mass
violence through political organs, with the Security Council being the
most powerful actor.228 Although the Security Counsel possesses a
variety of tools to address State violence,229 its overarching purpose is
to maintain peace not to impose international legal accountability.
However, as scholars have noted, the Security Council does make
legal determinations of international responsibility of States for their
involvement in atrocity crimes and acts against States pursuant to its
powers to respond to threats to international peace and security.230 For
example, the Security Council authorized military action against Iraq
for its invasion of Kuwait and subsequently created a claims tribunal
for Iraq to compensate injured parties for their losses.231 And under

reporting and monitoring; the compliance system is more “nuanced” and not based on
“wrongfulness” as is state responsibility. Brunée, supra note 11, at 51-52. “Nonetheless, once
a state is subject to the [interstate human rights treaty] system, a degree of accountability is
generated by publicly measures the state party’s conduct against the international standard, and
by the attendant pressure on it to comply.” Id. at 49; see also Systemic Effects of International
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 347 (noting that the practical effect of the law of state
responsibility is limited by “legal power of courts to give effect to the law” and therefore
political organs at international and regional levels will have a dominant role in
implementation).
228. Nollkaemper & van der Wilt, supra note 197, at 338 (arguing that an
accountability system for state criminality would require a different international system and
offering suggestions for reform); Ian Scobbie, Assumptions and Presuppositions: State
Responsibility for System Crimes, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 296; White, supra
note 199, at 317; Brunée, supra note 11, at 55.
229. White, supra note 199; Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note
2, at 336-49. The Security Council, after determining there has been a threat to peace, may
demand the offending state cease its behavior, impose sanctions, demand non-forcible
measures like disarming militias, refer the situation to the ICC, in addition to authorizing
military intervention. White, supra note 199, at 323.
230. Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 349 (noting that
the Security Council often combines determinations of a threat to the peace with determination
of a breach of an obligation. Such findings provide the basis for legal sanctions that are similar
to consequences of state responsibility); Simpson, supra note 201, at 85.
231. White, supra note 199, at 318 (observing that the security council also has
considerable powers under Chapter VII and distinct from any overlap with law of state
responsibility to address state crimes including to impose sanctions, take military action,
establish international tribunals or compensation commissions, target individuals, or “more
controversially promulgate international legislation binding on all states.”). Nollkaemper notes
several measures the Security Council has taken as a consequence of determining that
international crimes have been committed involving wrongful acts by states that resemble
human rights measures of non-repetition including calling for the invalidity of laws that
provide the conditions for international crimes; demobilization and reintegration of members
of armed forces; restructuring of security forces; military training in human rights standards,
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the Rome Treaty, the Security Council plays a role in the enforcement
of international criminal justice.232 Thus the Security Council serves
an as example to explore how the international system might take up
State accountability for atrocity crimes.233
B. The Disappearance of State Accountability in UN Security Council
Referrals
The imposition of international individual criminal
accountability is rightly considered a testament to the strength of
international accountability and anti-impunity as a set of normative
commitments capable of galvanizing international action. The
Security Council referrals of the situations in Darfur and Libya,
respectively, to the ICC are examples of this phenomenon.234 These
actions should be understood as part of the resurgence of international
criminal accountability from its origins at Nuremberg. Yet in its
current incarnation, individual criminal responsibility is untethered
from consideration of State accountability. In fact, State legal
accountability virtually disappears from consideration. While not
undermining the significance of the ICC, it is important to probe what
this lacuna means for the international rule of law and for how the
international community of nations responds to State crimes. One
question that the neglect of international State accountability raises is
whether international criminal accountability is a mere distraction or
decoy drawing attention away from addressing the role of States in
perpetrating atrocity crimes and in maintaining structures that may
threaten peace, even after responsible leaders have been prosecuted in
The Hague.

and developing capacities of police forces and strengthening of the judicial system. Systemic
Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 351.
232. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b).
233. There are good reasons to be skeptical of the ability of the Security Council to
serve as an effective enforcement mechanism for state responsibility. Scholars concede that
while the Council has the authority to adopt a more robust approach to international state
accountability, the political power dynamics of this body create obstacles to change. White,
supra note 199, at 316 (arguing that the horizontal and consensual nature of international law
impeded states’ ability to confront state crimes effectively).
234. See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6491st mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26,
2011); U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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1. Finding but Not Acting on State Responsibility
The Security Council referrals of Sudan and Libya to the ICC
illustrate the theory of international accountability for mass violence
as one of individual criminal responsibility exclusive of actions to
hold the state legally accountable. In each case, the Security Council
predicated its referral on findings that state authorities were involved
in gross human rights abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law.235 This legal determination ineluctably led to the
need to impose individual criminal sanctions. The logic operating is
that “accountability” and an end to “impunity” are necessary as
normative matters to promote justice as well serve instrumental aims
of achieving peace and reconciliation.236 Although the role of the state
in perpetrating atrocities is an explicit basis for the referrals, the only
legal consequence the Security Council imposed on the offending
states was to seek an ICC prosecution of responsible individuals.237
The French proposal for a Security Council referral for Syria similarly
contemplated only individual criminal sanctions.238
In the case of Sudan, the International Commission of Inquiry,239
which preceded the Security Council referral, recommended that the
235. S.C. Res. 1593, pmbl. (Mar. 31, 2005) (based on Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (2005) Pursuant to Resolution 1564
(2004) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 determining the government of Sudan and the Janajweed as
responsible for international crimes [hereinafter ICID Report]); S.C. Res. 1970 pmbl. (Feb. 26,
2011).
236. Both referrals are based on the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers to protect
threats to international peace and security and the Security Council meeting discussions reflect
the views of state representatives that call for criminal accountability for perpetrators to
strengthen peace and security. See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6491st mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26, 2011); U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158
(Mar. 31, 2005) (reflecting the views of state representatives that call for criminal
accountability for perpetrators to strengthen peace and security during Security Council
meeting discussions when using Chapter VII powers).
237. The Security Council includes other state-centric actions—its Sudan referral
includes a recommendation for the creation of restorative justice mechanisms and its Libyan
referral includes an arms embargo and travel ban. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 235, ¶5 (also
recommending to Sudan the creation of restorative justice mechanisms); S.C. Res. 1970, supra
note 235, ¶¶ 4-14. However neither of these measures is based on attribution of state
responsibility for atrocity crimes.
238. Proposed Syria S.C. Resolution 348, supra note 3, pmbl.
239. S.C. Res. 1564, ¶ 12 (Sept. 18, 2004) (finding that that the ongoing violence in
Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security); see also S.C. Res. 1556 (Jul. 30,
2004). As impetus for Resolution 1564, the Security Council found that the ongoing violence
in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Secretary-General gave
the Commission three months to investigate and report its findings, requesting that it report
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Security Council establish a State compensation commission for
victims.240 The Commission determined that the duty to provide
individual reparations, originating in human rights law had migrated
to State responsibility for violations of humanitarian law, was now a
customary obligation:
[W]henever a gross breach of human rights is committed which
also amounts to an international crime, customary international
law not only provides for the criminal liability of the individuals
who have committed that breach, but also imposes an obligation
on States of which the perpetrators are nationals, or for which
they acted as de jure or de facto organs, to make reparation
(including compensation) for the damage made.241

However, in its referral, the Security Council makes no mention
of the Commission’s recommendation. The idea simply disappears.
Although the Security Council acknowledges findings in both
referrals that these States committed international crimes and so
violated erga omnes obligations (obligations owed to the international
community), it does not consider State responsibility for these acts.
And without discussion of State responsibility there is no attention to
any special forms that such breaches might entail—think of postwar
Germany—like loss of territory, new elections, or reform of State
institutions—or constitutional and legal reforms like security sector
reform, separation of powers, and civilian control of the armed forced
recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur on transitional justice—
to bring a fuller measure of justice to the countries and lay the
groundwork for a sustainable peace.
2. The Opportunity of Enforcing State Obligations to the International
Community
The Security Council referrals put into sharp relief the
uncoordinated and insufficient international system of State legal
accountability for atrocity crimes. While there is factual and some
legal overlap, the mechanisms for enforcement of dual responsibility
back to the Security Council by January 25, 2005. The final report focuses specifically on
events that occurred between February 2003 and January 2005. See ICID Report, supra note
235, at 2.
240. ICID Report, supra note 235, ¶ 601.
241. Id. ¶ 598 (emphasis added); see also Christine Byron, Comment on the Report of
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 5
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351, 359 (2005).
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for atrocities are largely distinct.242 States established the ICC but
have not been interested in creating a comparable supranational
judicial mechanism to enforce erga omnes obligations.243 Powerful
States are reluctant to subject their actions to international legal
oversight. Judicial human rights mechanisms, serve to develop the
law of State responsibility in the context of duties to victims but this
system is not a substitute for an accountability system to enforce State
responsibility for international crimes. Judicial enforcement of human
rights obligations puts the burden on individuals to bring
complaints,244 and while in theory human rights mechanisms could
function to enforce robust measures of State responsibility for
atrocities, they have not done so.245 The interstate human rights
mechanisms rely on dialogue with States, and their decisions are nonbinding. While the human rights regime is doing important and
effective work, it is not an international accountability system.
In fact, international criminal courts and human rights
mechanisms reflect liberal conceptualizations of international justice
and may serve to obscure the lack of international legal accountability
for violations of obligations to humanity. Justice Jackson’s opening
statement at Nuremberg is oft-quoted for its eloquent argument for
international criminal liability: “Of course, the idea that a state, any
more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always
are committed only by persons.”246 But the next sentence, a
restatement of international law, is not valorized: “While it is quite
proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or corporation
for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable
to let such a legalism become the basis of personal immunity.”247
International justice and State accountability for gross human rights
violations has come to apply the first sentence of the passage and
242. BEATRICE I. BONAFE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 28 (2009).
243. White, supra note 199, at 324-27.
244. Gerry Simpson attributes this development to the trend in international law after
Nuremberg to recognize the individual. Simpson, supra note 201, at 75. “The move to
individual responsibility, then, in international criminal law, modifies this tendency [of
nonenforcement] and has been hailed as a way of giving human rights law the bite it was
thought to lack.” Id. at 76.
245. Human rights mechanisms generally prefer compensatory remedies for victims of
human rights violations and have not developed measures of mass compensation or guarantees
of non-repetition that extend to large-scale institutional and structural reforms.
246. Opening Speech, supra note 26.
247. Id. (emphasis added).
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ignore that Nuremberg was not intended to change the pre-existing
international law of State liability. However, recognition of individual
criminal liability has been misinterpreted to equate collective liability
with collective guilt, and thus antithetical to the liberal premise of the
new international legal order. And transitional justice has continued to
carry this banner.
State crimes are violations of duties owed to the international
community, but the development of the relevant branches of
international law has meant that the international community has not
seen fit to establish a judicial enforcement mechanism.248 The results
of States’ preference for addressing State crimes through the political
organ of the Security Council can be seen in the ICC referrals. The
Security Council, without any hint of irony, effectively insists on a
fractured and partial application of international rule of law. On the
one hand, the Council emphasizes the importance of enforcing
individual criminal responsibility. On the other hand, it elides any
discussion of State culpability for the commission of international
crimes and appropriate measures to punish the offending States.249
3. The Challenge to Enforcing State Obligations to the International
Community
What are some of effects of ignoring State legal accountability?
From the perspective of international relations, it preserves political
flexibility. The singular focus on legal accountability of individuals
allows offending States, like Serbia, to sacrifice their (former) “bad”
leaders to international criminal justice to gain benefits of interstate
cooperation, like membership in the European Union. The “good”
third-party States are seen to do justice by siphoning off the bad
actors to international courts while they maintain or rehabilitate the
offending State as a stable partner.250 And separate from the multi248. Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 336 (“The fact that,
largely due to the jurisdictional limitations, neither the ICJ nor any other court was able to
identify a collectivity that was responsible for the genocide illustrates the shortcomings of the
law of international responsibility in dealing with such entities in system crimes and the need
for rethinking of the connection between international law and system criminality.”).
249. The status quo also preserves political flexibility in how the international
community chooses to respond, or not, to state crimes. As Nigel White argued: “Reference to
the International Criminal Court is not putting justice first, it is using a mechanism of justice
for not taking any action that would restore peace but also prevent further crimes from being
committed.” White, supra note 199, at 323.
250. SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 11.
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lateral benefits, powerful States are served by observing State
sovereignty in these circumstances lest they set a precedent and find
themselves subject to similar scrutiny. While international power will
undoubtedly manifest in which States are selected for accountability,
with weak States more likely to be subject to enforcement, this should
be weighed against the rule of law values promoted by recognition of
State responsibility. Not only does the current system deny legal
enforcement of State obligations to remedy harms to victims and
society more generally, it also creates the illusion of international
criminal accountability as the full measure of justice the international
community can and should deliver. Residents of States that have
committed atrocity crimes against their own populations are the direct
beneficiaries of remedies for State responsibility.251 The affected
populations stand in urgent need of adequate legal protections, an
independent judiciary, security forces that respect human rights, and
measures to promote social justice—all of which fall within
guarantees of non-repetition.252 While not to minimize the challenges
to fair enforcement, these are second order problems. Currently,
transitional justice is not talking about State legal accountability and
its consequences. The legal obligations of States for failing to prevent
atrocity crimes or for their direct involvement in their perpetration are
not surfaced. The ICC becomes the measure of international
punishment and state accountability is not a feature of this discussion.
C. Changing the Politics of International Justice
Transitional justice colludes in this submergence of State
accountability. Within the field, the absolutist model of legal
accountability is hegemonic: punishment of the State is rejected
normatively as a form of collective punishment. Yet the aim of
advocates making this claim was to support international criminal
trials, not to argue against state liability. However, this framing
together with the formal rejection of State crimes has served to efface
State legal responsibility as an international response to mass
violence. Versailles is flouted as the cautionary tale of collective
guilt: Nuremberg its anodyne corrective. But what if we treated
Versailles as merely a bad case of State responsibility, while the

251. de Greiff Report, supra note 22, ¶ 20(c).
252. Id.
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Potsdam framework is understood as an example of a more measured
and balanced application of remedies for dual responsibility?
1. Transitional Justice’s Conception of Law and State Liability
The calls within transitional justice for remedying the structures
of State violence ignore the law of State responsibility and the
purchase it offers. These voices come from the periphery of
transitional justice, raising the need for social justice against the
hegemony of legal (criminal law) and top-down solutions. The hybrid
and grafted accountability models implicitly recognize the problem of
system criminality and its legacy for social reconstruction but do not
look to address these from the perspective of State legal
accountability and do not seek the framework of state responsibility
as a source of leverage.
The transitional justice accountability models recognize State
responsibility in two regards: (1) the State duty to prosecute and (2)
the duty to provide reparations to victims. These underserve the field.
The guarantees of non-repetition developed in human rights
jurisprudence and at the ICJ pale in comparison to the muscularity
that is needed. The more extreme State-focused measures the Allies
imposed on Germany and Japan and the more ambitious initiatives of
the Special Rapporteur on transitional justice provide more fertile
examples of what legal remedies could be contemplated.
When States target groups for bloody attack based on sectarian,
ethnic, or racial divisions, it is reasonable to assume that striking
down discriminatory laws that constituted State policy, creating bills
of rights, and establishing constitutional courts to enforce these
protections are prudent measures to dismantle offending State
structures and to prevent recurrence of State violence. We can
advance international rule of law by identifying these as legal
obligations owed not just to victims but to the international
community as a whole based on the role of the State in perpetrating
atrocities.
The Special Rapporteur’s policy approach to guarantees of nonrepetition is important, but transitional justice can and should go
further to enlist international law in this regard. The Special
Rapporteur’s is a soft law mandate.253 Transitional justice scholars
253. See Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/
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and advocates could seek to leverage the international law of State
responsibility. By way of example, proponents could seek to harness
the Chapter VII authority of the Security Council. The Security
Council could adopt an approach to accountability for Statesponsored atrocities that encompasses dual responsibility. In other
words, the Security Council could, as appropriate, refer situations to
the ICC and direct States to fulfill their legal obligations for State
responsibility through providing compensation, undertaking
constitutional reforms, etc. This begs the question of what would be
required for transitional justice to make this intellectual shift and
move from a politics of accountability understood only as criminal
accountability to a politics of accountability that seeks to address both
the individual leaders as well as the structural and collective
dimensions of mass atrocity crimes?
The elision of State accountability in transitional justice shapes
the type of politics of accountability that are possible. Politics in this
case refers to the character of the debate among competing ideas
about what the international community should do to respond to mass
violence. Currently, the politics of international accountability are
framed by transitional justice, which in turn relies on legalism
exclusively to justify individual international criminal accountability.
The transitional justice conceptualizations of accountability contribute
to a politics of liberalism insofar as transitional justice confines
sanction to individuals and takes our eyes off of the role of State
structures in perpetrating international crimes.
This limited view of State legal accountability is also galvanized
by the development of the modern international legal system that has
seen the maturation of human rights norms and mechanisms relative
to State responsibility. Robert Meister and Samuel Moyn each offer
histories of the rise of human rights movements as bound up with the
death of revolutions.254 Liberalism and human rights have triumphed
over other emancipatory projects that focus on more radical
redistributive and structural reform projects. Furthermore, human
rights and its advocates strengthen international criminal law by
Pages/Introduction.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Allehone Mulugeta Abebe,
Special Rapporteurs as Law Makers: The Developments and Evolution of the Normative
Framework for Protecting and Assisting Internally Displaced Persons, 15 INT’L J. HUM. RTS.
286 (2011).
254. ROBERT MEISTER, AFTER EVIL: THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (2011);
SAMUEL MOYN: THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 170 (2010).
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insisting on the State duty to prosecute. These two legal branches
share their origins in the horrors of the Second World War, are
intellectually consistent with one another, and practically mutually
reinforcing. Individuals are the objects of attention in each, as rightsbearers, and the aim of both areas is to ensure human flourishing
through a normative regime.
So configured, the Nuremberg/absolutist model of accountability
and the aspects of the hybrid and grafted models that accept criminal
prosecutions understand accountability as a liberal exercise, which
works against seeing the need for collective liability to address State
atrocities. Jackson’s call to pierce sovereign immunity to hold war
criminals accountable extinguishes his caveat that the legal fiction of
the State must remain for purposes of imposing collective liability.
Hence the Nuremberg Principles reach their full expression with the
International Criminal Court and the Draft Articles of State
Responsibility artfully camouflage State crimes as violations of
higher order norms, where they lay in wait for future expression.
Transitional justice has colluded in the international preference for
liberal justice by omitting State accountability from its discourse. This
leaves the question of how to address State breaches of these norms to
international political, rather than legal, processes. The result may
serve sovereign States but certainly not the affected populations. And
the persistence of State structures and institutions unrepentant,
unchanged, and legally unchallenged after mass violence, threatens
peace and security.
What liberalism offers is fealty to rule of law values. This can be
drawn upon to call for invigorating international processes to
vindicate the collective interests of humanity through State
accountability. State accountability and adherence to international law
obligations is part of international rule of law. Identifying State
transgressors as responsible for their involvement in international
crimes and insisting on commensurate legal remedies advances rule
of law values and offers a potentially potent legal tool to secure
structural remedies that can promote sustainable peace. The
conditions under which pursuit of State legal accountability is
warranted deserve further study. The debates among realists versus
idealists regarding whether pursuit of justice for war criminals would
jeopardize peace, are similarly pertinent to the question of State
responsibility. Without resolving those questions here, the point is
that this is a discussion that transitional justice should welcome.
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Without it, transitional justice colludes with the status quo in which
state legal accountability for atrocity crimes is invisible.
2. Overcoming Transitional Justice’s Elision of State Legal
Accountability
What would it mean for transitional justice to incorporate calls
for State accountability? Current conceptual barriers need to be
addressed, a sketch of which is offered here. For purposes of
discussion, the Security Council is taken as an example of an existing
international institution that could instigate State accountability.255
First, transitional justice needs to incorporate the conceptual
contribution of dual responsibility that international law offers. The
State and the individual may both violate international norms in the
commission of atrocities. Transitional justice should look past the
philosophical objection of Jaspers to collective guilt and see that
collective liability of the State rests comfortably with pursuit of
individual criminal responsibility. All three transitional justice models
of accountability adopt the inherited logic of Nuremberg that rejects
collective legal guilt as illiberal and dangerous. This is a false trap.
Proponents of international criminal law were happy to accept, if not
advance, Jaspers’ critique in pursuit of enforcement of international
criminal sanction of individuals. Yet individual sanction and State
liability are two separate concepts and international law helps to see
that promotion of one does not need to come at the expense of the
other. This is the conceptual contribution that dual responsibility in
international law offers to transitional justice. Transitional justice
could understand the State entity as a governance structure (the legal
sovereign) and not as the legal personality of “the people.” The
principle that a State, like an individual, that breaches its international
obligations is liable for the consequences of its actions is the basis of
international law, as Justice Jackson understood. Embracing the legal
fiction of the State as a collective entity does not displace individual
criminal liability. Understanding the State as separate from the people
legally and normatively would help to shed the false shackles of

255. International legal scholars have suggested that the UN Security Council can
serve as a site for the functional equivalent of a legal mechanism dedicated to international
enforcement of state responsibility for atrocities. Systemic Effects of International
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 352. The question of whether the Security Council is the
appropriate international mechanism is beyond the scope of this article.
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collective guilt that have hampered recognition of State crimes as part
of international justice discourse and practice.
Next, State culpability needs to be intellectually authorized by
transitional justice. Here, the full history of the international
community’s flirtation with State crimes should be excavated to
capitalize on international principles that recognize that State
violation of obligations erga omnes has special consequences. The
formal distinction between fault and wrongfulness in international law
is slippery and borders on sophistry when it comes to atrocity crimes.
The drafting history of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
shows how penal sanction at one point was uncontroversial. As the
international commitment to a collective, humanitarian world order
receded from its high-water mark in the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War, the normative scope of State responsibility
shrunk to exclude penal sanction. Yet the essential rule of law values
that promote fair application of shared norms, apply equally to
individuals and to States that perpetrate atrocity crimes.
Transitional justice gains much of its legitimacy from advancing
these normative justice claims. Given the scope and nature of Stateperpetrated mass violence, advancing State legal responsibility for
such acts has the functional normative equivalent of acknowledging
state conduct as wrongful and reprehensible. In other words,
transitional justice need not argue for a positive international law of
State crimes. To bring States to account for their mass bloodshed, it
can simply promote existing State legal responsibility for acts that are
also criminalized under international law. Unfortunately, transitional
justice has absorbed the rationale of the Nuremberg trials and ignored
the precedential value of the imposition of structural reforms on
criminal States offered by the examples of the Potsdam Protocol and
Agreement.256
Transitional justice has expanded to include demands that States
adopt holistic approaches to repair the structural drivers of mass
violence like discrimination, structural poverty, and lack of rights
protection. State responsibility offers a way to identify and
acknowledge these demands as legal justice remedies, rather than as

256. This phenomenon is illustrated by the recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur
on transitional justice, in which the human rights remedies for mass violations are offered as
examples for transitional justice policy and the measures adopted for Germany and Japan are
not mentioned.
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policy options.257 This will be aided if the field embraces the full
historic record of the international response to the crimes of Germany
and Japan, which included legal, political, and economic reform
alongside criminal accountability. Doing so would allow transitional
justice to reconceptualize accountability as consisting of two aspects
existing in a horizontal relationship: individual and State
responsibility. Each aspect attends to different dimensions of justice
after mass violence.
Finally, transitional justice needs to reconcile itself to legalism.
Currently, international criminal law diverts the gaze of transitional
justice from the laws, institutions, and state practices that give rise to,
sustain, and may endure after States commit international crimes.
International criminal justice may be politically expedient but it does
not substitute for other measures of justice—striking down
discriminatory laws, particularly those that generate economic and
social exclusion that drive violence; establishing constitutional
guarantees of individual rights and mechanisms for their enforcement;
conducting institutional reform of police and armed forces, etc.—that
may be required to repair the harm inflicted by State violence and to
ensure peace. The international law on State responsibility and human
rights offer legal norms that legally bind the State in service of these
justice aims.
Calling for enforcement of legal obligations of the State that
could address system criminality will not constitute all that societies
may need to do ensure a sustainable peace. But currently, transitional
justice is not making full use of the legal tools available. The hybrid
and grafted transitional justice accountability models recognize the
lacuna of redress for system criminality but implicitly or explicitly
address this by deprioritizing not just criminal justice but legalism as
the metric for accountability. Seeing the value in pursuing State
accountability would awaken transitional justice to the lost
opportunity of the Sudan Commission of Inquiry. Its recommendation
for victim compensation and a truth commission is an example of
what State accountability for international crimes can look like.
Guarantees of non-repetition could also be crafted to address root
causes of the conflict. For example, in the case of Darfur these lie in

257.

de Greiff Report, supra note 22; discussion supra Part II.
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disputes about local governance and land, which result in economic
and social marginalization of residents in the region.258
To be sure, the hybrid and transformative models of transitional
justice accountability bring needed attention to grounded and bottomup perspectives on what measures are needed to repair society. But
the State, as a unit of analysis, is a vital component to eradicating the
“root and branch” problems that transformative justice in particular
seeks to accomplish. The structural reforms like new constitutions,
institutional reform, local control, and reparations to victims—the
kinds of root and branch problems that transformative transitional
justice wants to fix—fit within what the UN advocates for transitional
justice policy. These initiatives would be more legally potent if
advanced as remedies of State responsibility.
In addition to these practical effects, the absence of a discourse
about State wrongdoing submerges the fact that current approaches
enable State impunity for atrocities. States are charged with
guaranteeing the welfare of their residents. When States violate this
basic compact by directing the institutions of the State to commit
mass violence, State culpability should be acknowledged and legal
consequences imposed. International law uniquely is able to convey
the necessary and appropriate opprobrium for behavior that offends
global values.
In order for transitional justice to incorporate this perspective,
the transitional justice critics of legalism would need to accept that
law is not the enemy of the changes they seek to promote. In fact
international law theoretically is capable of delivering much of their
demands. To be sure, the law of State responsibility is not a magic
bullet. The arrested development of the Draft Articles and State
practice in imposing special measures against States that commit
international crimes point to the latent state of international legal
accountability of States. The problem is that the preoccupation of
transitional justice with individual criminal accountability prevents
the field from seeing how this debate occupies its legal imagination.
The inability to see how the focus on international criminal
accountability distracts attention from state accountability may be the
biggest threat we face to adopting an adequate and holistic response
to international atrocity crimes.

258. ICID Report, supra note 235, ¶¶ 61-62.
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CONCLUSION
It is a dilemma for international law that State authorities carry
out international crimes through the instrumentality of State systems.
The development of the international legal order after the Allies’
defeat of Germany and Japan has favored individual criminal
responsibility as its highest form of sanction. Transitional justice as
the current body of thought and practice regarding how the
international community should respond when States are responsible
for the commission of mass atrocities adopts this thinking and ignores
that States may also be legally responsible for such acts. This
approach reflects a misguided repudiation of collective guilt that the
Nuremberg trials have come to symbolize. It overlooks that State
liability is a bedrock principle for State violations of international
law. It also ignores the remedies for State liabilities the Allies
imposed on Germany and Japan to refashion the defeated States,
which included extensive corrective structural measures. Thus
transitional justice inherits and remembers a fragmented history.
This partial incorporation of history is reflected in how the field
conceptualizes legal accountability. A fuller review of the
development of the postwar international legal system reminds us that
State crimes were an uncontroversial proposition in the early decades
of the UN system. International law relevant to addressing mass
atrocities has developed into disparate branches, with international
criminal law assuming the lead. This Article has argued that
transitional justice has incorporated individual criminal responsibility
as its primary conception of what constitutes international legal
accountability for atrocities. Transitional justice has three competing
models of accountability and none of them recognizes the importance
of State legal accountability. As a result, transitional justice fails to
capitalize on the rule of law values that undergird the international
system to press for more robust measures against States that have
committed international crimes. The failure of transitional justice to
call out offending States does damage. It cloaks mass suffering in a
false veil of sovereignty. It enables an international system in which
criminal states are able to maintain compromised governance systems
by offering up individuals to criminal prosecution. And powerful
States shield themselves from scrutiny for any role they may play in
being complicit with perpetrator States.
Currently, individual criminal accountability occupies the center
of the politics of transitional justice. To change the status quo to
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enable State accountability to assume equal prioritization and harness
its legal potential to redress State structures and promote sustainable
peace, transitional justice needs to reconsider its relationship to law
and to legal accountability. Doing so is risky. It will be important that
the recognition of State accountability does not mean that the field
loses sight of the limits of law or the perspective of communities and
individuals on transitional justice responses. Yet the failure to respond
is even greater. The capacity of states to inflict mass suffering appears
nearly unlimited. The international community can develop greater
tools to redress such abuses. To see that international criminal justice
is not the full measure of legal justice does not denigrate its
contribution. It helps us to see that States enjoy impunity for
international crimes, and invites us to redouble our efforts to ensure
accountability for both the State and individual dimensions of
international atrocity crimes.
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